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ABSTRACT
This dissertation comprises three chapters focused on the conduct of monetary policy. Specifi-
cally, I use a blend of empirical and experimental research methods study unconventional monetary 
policy alternatives, to quantify the effect of information flow on markets, and to examine the 
effi-cacy of emergent changes in central bank communication.
Chapter one of this dissertation introduces an experimental framework that serves as a test-bed 
for both monetary and fiscal policies. This framework allows policymakers and academics to gen-
erate data regarding the efficacy of policy alternatives in a relatively low-cost, safe, and controlled 
environment. To validate this experimental framework, we explore two policy alternatives in a 
constrained policy environment: allowing a central bank to use negative nominal interest rates and 
permanently increasing the inflation t arget. Our findings indicate that negative interest rates can 
effectively stimulate demand, consistently. closing an output and employment gaps. However, 
permanently increasing an inflation target cannot.
Chapters two and three of this dissertation focus on central bank communication. Chapter two 
uses a high-frequency identification approach to quantify the effect of information flow on financial 
markets in the United Kingdom. Specifically, we study whether and how the U.K.’s yield curve 
responds to communication from the Bank of England (BoE) about the forecast uncertainty and 
balance of risks surrounding both inflation and output growth. We find that yields respond at least 
as strongly to this higher-order information as they do to information about the BoE’s expected 
paths for inflation and output g rowth. Chapter three describes an experiment in which we study 
how uncertainty in central bank communication influences individual expectations formation and 
individual forecast uncertainty. We find that reducing the precision of central bank communication 
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1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation focuses on the conduct of monetary policy. Specifically, I use a blend of
empirical and experimental research methods study unconventional monetary policy alternatives,to
quantify the effect of information flow on markets, and to examine the efficacy of emergent changes
in central bank communication.
The first chapter of my dissertation introduces an experimental framework that serves as a
testbed for monetary policy, fiscal policy, and central bank communication. This framework is built
around a simple overlapping generations model that can cleanly incorporate aggregate demand
shocks and that features a rules-based mechanistic central bank. The experimental economies in
this framework evolve according to the price expectations and real decisions of student subjects.
Importantly, aggregate demand shocks in this framework consistently generate deflationary and
liquidity trap episodes, which creates an idea environment to test the efficacy of policy interven-
tions. We validate this experimental environment by testing two unconventional monetary policy
alternatives: allowing a central bank to use negative policy rates and allowing a central bank to
permanently increase its inflation target. We find that implementing negative rates can consistently
pull economies out of liquidity traps, closing output and employment gaps. However, contrary to
theoretical predictions, permanently increasing the central bank’s inflation target cannot.
The second chapter of my dissertation considers the Bank of England’s density forecasts and its
revisions to quantify the effects of information flow on the financial markets and survey forecast-
ers. Central banks have increasingly relied on published forecasts to communicate their economic
outlook to market participants. Point forecasts and their revisions have been shown to move fi-
nancial markets. The effects of the higher-order moments, however, have not been investigated
thoroughly, and this is primarily due to data limitations. The Bank of England, on the other hand,
has been publishing information on its density forecasts since the late 1990s, making it useful for
our analysis. Using daily information on the financial markets, we find that the updates of higher
moments are more important in moving financial markets than the revisions to the first central
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moment of the density forecasts, making them relevant for monetary policy communication. Infor-
mation about output matters more than information about inflation, and the effect of information
is state-contingent. Finally, we see that the consensus forecast and level of forecast disagreement,
among professional forecasters are strongly correlated with updates in higher-order forecast mo-
ments.
This third chapter of my dissertation takes an experimental approach to provide further evi-
dence on the emerging practice by central banks of communicating forecast uncertainty to market
participants. To do this, we compare the effects of point and density projections in a learning-to-
forecast laboratory experiment where participants’ aggregated expectations about one- and two-
period-ahead inflation influence macroeconomic dynamics. Precise point projections are more
effective at managing inflation expectations. Point projections reduce disagreement and uncer-
tainty while nudging participants to forecast rationally. Supplementing the point projection with a
density forecast mutes many of these benefits. Relative to a point projection, density forecasts lead
to larger forecast errors, greater uncertainty about own forecasts, and less credibility in the central
bank’s projections. We also explore expectation formation in individual-choice environments to
understand the motives for responding to projections. Credibility in the projections is significantly
lower when strategic considerations are absent, suggesting that projections are primarily effective
as a coordination device. Overall, our results suggest that communicating uncertainty through
density projections reduces the efficacy of inflation point projections.
2
2. ESCAPING SECULAR STAGNATION WITH UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY
POLICY
2.1 Introduction
Many developed economies exhibit tell-tale symptoms of secular stagnation: decades-long
downward trends in natural interest rates, tepid output growth well below estimates of potential,
growing debt-to-GDP ratios, negative real interest rates, and below-target inflation. Furthermore,
these conditions persist despite expansionary policies employed by the Federal Reserve and by
other central banks. For instance, the United States spent seven years at its zero lower bound
before lifting off in 2015 and slowly climbed up to a meager 2.25% by 2019 thanks to, among other
things, extraordinary quantitative easing and forward guidance. Summers (2019) argued that this
was insufficient space to operate in a future recession. At the 2019 Jackson Hole Economic Policy
Symposium, Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell described this proximity to the effective
lower bound as “the pre-eminent monetary policy challenge of our time” as central bankers sought
out fresh policy tools.
Now, the unprecedented economic crisis brought on by the global pandemic has highlighted the
pressing need to expand the tool kits of policy-makers. Monetary interventions once considered
too extreme or perhaps outlandish are now finding their way into mainstream policy discussions.
Many central bankers are now giving serious consideration to raising inflation targets and imple-
menting negative policy rates, both of which would, in theory, stimulate inflation expectations and
propel economic activity. However, policymakers are hesitant to adopt these tools given the limited
evidence on their efficacy.
In this paper, we build a flexible and novel experimental environment to test-bed these uncon-
ventional policies, thereby providing policy makers with much-needed, timely evidence on their
effectiveness. Importantly, this environment, though tractable, captures many realistic and pressing
concerns by allowing for secular stagnation and liquidity traps at the zero lower bound. We use
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this framework to provide the first experimental evidence on the potency of raising the inflation
target and negative nominal interest rates in combating secular stagnation.
To this end, we adapt Eggertsson, Mehrotra, and Robbins (2019, EMR henceforth) to the lab. In
each experimental economy, groups of participants form expectations and make financial decisions
together with automated firms and policy makers. We expose each economy to an exogenous
deleveraging shock that should generate pessimistic inflation expectations and a secular stagnation
of the economy.
In our Baseline treatment, We find that most economies converge toward the initial full-employment
equilibrium and that deleveraging shocks consistently generate pessimistic expectations and typi-
cally manufacture various degrees of instability manifesting itself either in permanent deflation. In
most sessions the economies converge in the direction of the secular stagnation equilibrium.
We then explore alternative policy options to return the economy to its full employment equi-
librium after an extended episode at the zero lower bound. In our HigherTarget treatment, we
raise the inflation target from 10-30%, one policy prescription formalized by EMR. We find that
significantly increasing the central bank’s target, which in theory yields a multiplicity of equilibria,
does not effectively return any of the economies to the targeted, full-employment equilibrium. On
the other hand, removing the ZLB in our NegativeIR treatment consistently stimulates spending,
which in turn encourages inflationary expectations and a quick escape from the zero lower bound.
These economies stabilize at a full-employment equilibrium that coincides with the central bank’s
inflation target.
We see in all treatments that deleveraging shocks generate considerable consumption hetero-
geneity. Thus, the decrease in welfare is larger for some subjects than others following these
shocks. We also observe that deleveraging shocks effect expectations formation. Instability brings
about a high level of constant gain learning and other backward-looking heuristics.
The main takeaway from our experiments is that negative interest rates are more effective
than raising inflation targets at shifting consumption to the present and stimulating an economy
out of secular stagnation. Our findings suggest that inflation expectations and demand is better
4
stimulated through realized wealth effects than coordination on rational expectations equilibria.
Our participants fail to perceive a central bank’s higher inflation target credible after an extended
period of deflation.
We also make a number of valuable methodological contributions in this paper. First, we
demonstrate how a complex general equilibrium theoretical framework can be distilled to a simple
implementation that nonetheless allow for a meaningful interaction of expectations, decisions, and
monetary policy. This framework can flexibly be extended to allow for fiscal policy, credit markets,
policy communication and coordination. Additionally, we contribute to the experimental literature
by bridging learning-to-forecast and production economy experiments. Fusing these frameworks
allows us to link expectations and real decision in response to policy, filling a crucial but neglected
empirical gap.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 places our paper in the context of the
existing macroeconomics and experimental research. Section 3 lays out the theoretical framework
and hypotheses for our experiment. Section 4 provides details of the experimental implementation,
Section 5 presents our experimental results, and Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature
This paper makes important contributions to the macroeconomic literature on economic growth
and policy, as well as the experimental macroeconomic literature. We discuss these contributions
below.
2.2.1 Theoretical and Empirical
The existing liquidity trap literature, though large, does not provide a thorough treatment of
secular stagnation. As highlighted by EMR, this is because most models employ representative
agent frameworks1 where the long-run interest rate is uniquely determined by a representative
discount factor. Since the real interest rate must eventually revert to a positive long-run level,
ZLB episodes triggered by transitory shocks are themselves temporary. This theoretical outcome
1See Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), Eggertson
and Krugman (2012), and Werning (2012) for examples.
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yields a ’wait-and-see’ policy approach to liquidity traps, which would constitute an obvious fail-
ure of policy for an economy facing secular stagnation. To circumvent this issue and allow for
permanently-negative neutral real interest rates, EMR introduce ZLB episodes into an OLG model
(This was first shown by Samuelson (1958)).
Deflationary steady states can emerge in the New Keynesian framework. Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2001), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2017), and Benigno and Fornaro (2015) all
feature a ZLB that binds due to hysteresis. However, ZLB steady states in these models are locally
indeterminate and are open to the criticism that ZLB episodes driven by hysteresis are not ‘learn-
able’ and it is therefore unclear how such a steady state can coordinate expectations (Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Johannsen, 2016). However, Arifovic, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2018) show
that the liquidity trap equilibrium is learnable under social learning. Additionally, Gibbs (2018)
shows mathematically that both the deflationary and targeted-inflation equilibrium in EMR’s model
are both E-stable when they exist and that the full-employment, liquidity trap equilibrium is only
stable whenever agents in this OLG model face sufficiently large borrowing limits.
There is very limited evidence on the ability of central banks to increase inflation expectations
by raising their inflation target. Most inflation targeting central banks have kept their inflation
targets constant or reduce them after stabilizing their price level growth. There are two exceptions.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) first began targeting inflation in the range of 0 to 2
percent, and were quite effective in bringing inflation down from well over 6 percent in 1990 to
an average of 2.8 percent in the five years that followed. In 1996, the RBNZ increased the upper
bound of their range to 3 percent, effectively raising the midpoint from 1 to 1.5 percent. From 1996
to 2002, inflation averaged 1.8 percent, converging right toward the mid-point of the target range.
In 2003, the Bank raised the lower bound of the range from 0 to 1 percent, increasing the midpoint
to 2 percent. Over the next five years, average inflation rose to 2.8 percent, and from 2003-2019,
averaged 2 percent. More recently, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) experimented with communicating an
explicit inflation target and raising its target. In February 2012, the BoJ announced that it would
explicitly target inflation at 1 percent (this had been the implicit mid-point of an acceptable range
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of inflation since 2006). This announcement led to a modest reduction in deflation. In January
2013, BoJ further increased its target from 1 to 2 percent. While there was some rapid inflation
growth over the following year, inflation has fluctuated between 0.5-1%. Overall, it appears that
raising the target had a positive effect on inflation, albeit smaller than intended.
Finally, this paper contributes to an emerging literature that studies the use of negative policy
rates. This literature, while very important, is woefully incomplete due to an extreme lack of data.
Eggertsson, Juelsrud, Summers, and Wold (2019) use empirical data to show that negative policy
rates produce a lower bound on household deposits (DLB). They embed this DLB into a banking
sector model and show that negative rates are expansionary only under some conditions. Altavilla,
Burlon, Giannetti, and Holton (2019) use Euro-area data to show empirically that the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy does not break down when rates become negative. Wu and Xia
(2016) build a shadow rate term structure model (SRTSM) calibrated to the Euro Area and show
that all four of the ECB’s negative rate cuts lowered maturities along the short-end of the yield
curve. Further, they show that forward guidance may facilitate the transmission of negative rates.
Our experiment contributes to this literature by building a flexible framework capable of pro-
ducing empirical data surrounding the use of higher inflation targets and negative policy rates. Our
results mostly align with this existing literature in the sense that negative rates in our experimental
economies stimulate aggregate demand yielding an expansionary effect. Importantly, our frame-
work provides insight to how individual decisions and expectations respond to negative policy
rates, thereby shedding light on a transmission channel of negative rates that real-world data alone
cannot elucidate.
2.2.2 Experimental Macroeconomics
Begun largely in response to an invitation from Robert Lucas (1986), experimental macroe-
conomics is a relatively young but fruitful field of study focused on testing the microfoundations
of modern macroeconomic models in a controlled, laboratory setting (see John Duffy (2016) for
a thorough survey of the literature). Several branches of literature from this emergent field relate
closely to our research.
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Dynamic Optimization & Learning to Optimize in Individual and Production Economies
Settings
Laboratory experiments testing the ability of people to solve dynamic optimization problems in
the form of a one-sector, infinite-horizon model reveal that experimental subjects (relative to theo-
retical predictions) do a poor job of consumption smoothing (consumption often too closely tracks
current income) and that agents’ consumption decisions are not time-independent (For examples,
see Hey and Dardanoni (1988), Carbone and Hey (2004), Noussair and Matheny (2000), Lei and
Noussair (2002), Ballinger et al. (2003), Carbone (2006), Crockett and Duffy (2013), Carbone
and Duffy (2014) and Meissner (2016)). Possible explanations for such failures are binding liq-
uidity constraints, precautionary saving, and debt aversion. There are some exceptions, however.
Crockett and Duffy (2013) finds that subjects facing a concave utility function are able to optimize
within the framework of a Lucas Tree model (Duffy (2016), Lucas (1978)). Miller and Rholes
(2020) find that allowing for joint decisions, rather than individual decisions, improves choices in
the optimization task (relative to the representative benchmark) by about 40%.
The model we test here relies crucially on households making optimal consumption and bor-
rowing decisions over a life cycle. Inefficient behavior in one portion of the life cycle - under- or
over-borrowing while young, for example - has meaningful implications for the aggregate econ-
omy in later parts of the life cycle. The model we test assumes agents have perfect foresight and
that agents always borrow and spend along optimal paths. Thus, a potential pitfall here is the
inability of real people to correctly solve the life-cycle problem. This failure would drastically de-
crease aggregate stability and undermine equilibration. Importantly, it could potentially mute the
effects of policy interventions that operate on the economy my moderating intertemporal choice
(i.e. shifting demand by manipulating rates or influencing inflation expectations).
Production economy experiments involve studying the simultaneous coordination of decisions
of multiple agents in settings with input and output markets. Such experiments have been used
to study patterns of international trade, exchange rates, economic growth and rationing (Lei and
Noussair, 2002; Noussair et al. 1995, 1997, 2007; Fenig and Petersen, 2017). Our experiment will
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introduce an overlapping generations (OLG) structure to this production framework. Overlapping
generations models have been taken to the lab to study inflation (Arifovic, 1995), fiscal policy (Van
der Heijden et al., 1998), and coordination (Offerman et al. 2001). We make two methodological
contributions to this literature. First, we introducing a novel approach to modeling OLG economies
in the laboratory (discussed in detail in the design section). Second, we introduce a pricing
algorithm based on numerical methods that facilitates laboratory experimentation with models
whenever closed-form price equations are not feasible.
Expectations and Learning to Forecast In addition to the importance of optimal consump-
tion/borrowing behavior in models of secular stagnation, there exists much experimental work to
guide our implementation and understanding of expectations elicitation. Our experimental frame-
work assume agents are able to both forecast and optimize simultaneously. In particular, subjects
are able, while young, to perfectly forecast future (middle-aged) income and then borrow optimally
against this forecast. This use of rational expectations to close self-referential models allows mar-
ket clearing where otherwise yet unrealized information would serve as an obvious impediment.
As noted by Duffy (2016), this assumption disallows testing of theoretical models using real-
world empirical data since any failure of the data to match theoretical predictions could be driven
either by faulty expectational assumptions or by some other aspect of the model. Much of the
existing experimental literature fails to provide support for the rational expectations assumption
(discussed by Camerer (1998), Ochs (1995), Duffy (2016)). Nevertheless, rational expectations
dominates macroeconomic literature and so eliciting expectations is a fundamental component of
testing macroeconomic theory in the laboratory.
The primary approach used within the literature is the ‘learning-to-forecast’ model initiated by
Marimon and Sunder (1993, 1994, 1995) and developed by Heemeijer et al. (2009) and Hommes
(2011), whereby subjects’ elicited price forecasts simultaneously determine automated demand
decisions of traders and aggregate price outcomes. This method complements the ‘learning-to-
optimize’ approach used in the literature described earlier in this section. The combination of
price expectations and decisions have been studied in Bao et al. (2012), Petersen and Winn (2014),
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and Petersen (2016). We incorporate both approaches into our experiment. Subjects in our experi-
ment provide price expectations that then determine projected borrowing constraints and budgets.
Subjects use these budgets to make borrowing and savings decisions.
Monetary Policy Experiments This paper also contributes to an emerging literature on liquidity
traps. Arifovic and Petersen (2017) show in a learning-to-forecast experiment that expectations
significantly overreact to exogenous demand shocks and that neither qualitative nor quantitative
communication of a central bank’s higher inflation target can effectively rescue an economy mired
in a deflationary trap. However, the authors do find that quickly applied and certain fiscal stimulus
can stabilize expectations and facilitate economic recovery. Hommes, Massaro, and Salle (2015)
also find that fiscal stimulus is effective at mitigating deflationary spirals. Ahrens, Lustenhouwer,
and Tettamanzi (2017) extend Arifovic and Petersen by allowing for human vs. robotic central
bankers. They find that human central bankers can more effectively build up credibility by slowly
adjusting their inflation projections upward while at the ZLB. Our paper is the first to explicitly
study the effects of raising the inflation target on both expectations and real decisions.
More generally, learning-to-forecast experiments have been used to study a host of questions
related to central bank communication: the construction and communication of interest rate pro-
jections and macroeconomic projections (Kryvtsov and Petersen, 2015, 2020; Mokhtarzadeh and
Petersen, 2017; Ahrens et al., 2017), the communication of inflation targets (Cornand and M’Baye,
2016), and macroeconomic literacy training (Mirdamadi and Petersen, 2018). In general, these ex-
periments highlight the importance of simple, easy-to-understand communications and information
in guiding expectations to the rational expectations equilibrium.
Macroeconomists have also studied monetary policy-relevant questions in production econ-
omy settings. Bosch-Domènech and Silvestre (1998) and Lian and Plott (1997) Fenig et al. (2018)
study monetary policy in a production economy where households may also trade in speculative
asset markets. They show that a ‘leaning-against-the wind’ monetary policy that raises the nominal
interest rates with asset price inflation can be effective in stabilizing asset prices with little conse-
quence for the real side of the economy. In their environment, nominal interest rates are unbounded
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and can become significantly negative. This serves to fuel asset price bubbles.
Our paper builds on this research by providing the first study to compare the effects of bounded
and negative interest rates on consumption-saving decisions. We find that negative interest rates
propel consumers to shift consumption to the present.
2.3 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
2.3.1 Households
Consider an economy with young, middle-aged, and old households. Households derive utility
from a single consumption good, Ct. Young households receive no income. Instead, they borrow
from middle-aged households but face an exogenous borrowing constraint Dt2, which constitutes
some proportion of middle-aged income. Middle-aged households earn income from the inelastic
provision of labor, L, and from firm profits Zt. These households repay debt accrued while young,
and then split remaining money between consumption and savings. Old households consume with
savings. A one-period, risk-free bond facilitates lending and borrowing (between middle-aged and
young households) in the loanable funds market.3 Additionally, households trade one-period debt
denominated in money. The central bank controls the per-period nominal rate of return, it, on this
asset. Thus, households maximize:
Et{ln(Cyt ) + βln(Cmt+1) + β2(Cot+2)} (2.1)
subject to the following budget constraints:
2This is taken within the theory to be some exogenous debt constraint that the authors use to introduce debt
deleveraging shocks.
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t represent nominal wages, the aggregate price level, borrowing of
the young, and savings for the middle-aged in some period t. Equation (2.3) implies that Dt is
always binding, Equation (2.5) implies that old households consume all income, and Equation (2.6)











Firms are perfectly competitive price takers with technology Yt = Lαt that maximize profits via




Without no source of market friction, dynamics would match those of an endowment economy
and Equation (2.8) would pin down real wages. Thus, the model includes wage rigidity. Workers
do not work for wages that fall below some threshold comprising a convex combination of a the
flexible wage, W flex = αPtLα−1t , and wages from the previous period, Wt−1. Thus, wages in this
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model are given by
Wt = max{Wt,Wt−1 + (1− γ)W flex} (2.9)
where γ ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of nominal wage rigidity in the economy. Note that
γ = 0, γ = 1 describe fully flexible wages and complete wage rigidity, respectively. Whenever Wt
equals the fully flexible wage, then an economy is experiencing inflation and labor markets clear
without rationing. Otherwise, an economy experiences deflation and firms ration labor uniformly.
2.3.3 Central Bank
A mechanistic central bank sets nominal rates according to a Taylor-type monetary policy rule
1 + it = max
(






where i∗ is the steady-state nominal interest rate, Π∗ is the central bank’s gross inflation target,
and φπ > 1 is the central bank’s reaction coefficient to deviations of inflation from the inflation
target. Gross inflation is given by Πt =
Pt+1
Pt
. The assumption of perfect foresight, combined
Equation (2.7), implies a standard Fisher equation:




This, coupled with the binding ZLB, places a lower bound on the inflation rate for a constant-
inflation equilibrium:




EMR note that this bound is meaningful whenever there is a permanently negative real rate
because it implies that steady state inflation must remain positive.4
2.3.4 Equilibrium
Whenever economies face deflation, the long-term nominal rigidities prevent the emergence of
market clearing wages. Thus, the real cost of wages rises causing firms to ration labor demand and
an output gap to emerge. Whenever Π ≥ 1, then Lt = L
α
,Wt = W
flex, and there is no output gap
so that Yt = L
α
= Y f .
AS is then split into:
Yt = L
α







, Π < 1 (2.14)
where Equation (2.13) describes the vertical portion of the AS curve and Equation (2.14) the up-
ward sloping portion of the AS curve.5 Note that the degree of wage rigidity γ dictates the slope
of the upward sloping portion of the AS curve and can, under certain conditions, determine both
the existence and uniqueness of a deflationary equilibrium.
AD is split into:
Y = D +






, i > 0 (2.15)
Y = D +
(1 + β)(1 + g)D
β
Π, i = 0 (2.16)
4For example, a natural rate of -4% implies a lower bound on inflation of 4%, which precludes the existence of an
inflation target below 4% whenever prices are flexible. Otherwise, there would not exist an equilibrium. Hence the
introduction of nominal wage rigidities as a source of market friction.
5The theory assumes that expectations adjust so that there is no trade off between unemployment and inflation
in environments characterized by permanently high inflation. However, this same assumption does not carry over to
environments characterized by low inflation or deflation. Hence, the upward sloping portion of this supply curve.
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2.3.5 Monetary Policy
Using the equilibrium equations described above, we assume the following parameter values
for discussion in this section: Π∗ = 1.1, φπ = 2, γ = .3, Yf = 1, α = .7, β = 1, g = 0, L = 1,
which are the inflation target, a measure of the central bank’s responsiveness to the inflation gap,
the degree of wage rigidity, the level of full-employment output, output elasticity of labor, the
discount factor, population growth rate, and the inelastic labor supply, respectively. Households
face two decisions during the full lifecycle: a borrowing decision while young and a consump-
tion/savings decision while middle-aged. These two decisions drive the dynamics of this model.
The concavity of the utility function is such that an optimizing middle-aged agent must consump-
tion smooth. Savings from this cohort flows into the loanable funds market. Demand for loanable
funds originates exclusively from the constrained borrowing decisions of the young.
To understand the impact of a deleveraging shock, suppose an inflationary economy faces a
reduction in the amount of money that Young households may borrow for consumption. This
causes a sharp decrease in the demand for loans but not the supply of loanable funds which, in
turn, causes the market clearing interest rate to fall. Thus, the young who face a deleveraging
shock in period t will have excess resources in period t+ 1. This causes an increase in the supply
of loanable funds in t+1, further decreasing the interest rate. This translates into a decrease in AD
as consumption becomes increasing desirable relative to saving. We illustrate the impact of such a
shock on inflation-output dynamics in Figure 2.1.
The downward sloping portion of AD is described by Equation (2.15) and the upward sloping
portion by Equation (2.16).6 Importantly, shocks to D can eliminate a unique inflationary equilib-
rium and create instead a deflationary equilibrium. We set the pre-shock value of D = 35%, which
yields a unique inflationary equilibrium with 10% inflation. This equilibrium occurs where AD3
intersects AS in Figure 2.1. A deleveraging shock reduces the borrowing constraint to D = 30%,
which shifts the upward sloping demand curve in Figure 2.1 inward and yields a unique secular
6A shock to D impacts both segments of the curve but that this shock is offset by a simultaneous adjustment of
i* in Equation (2.15) so that only the upward sloping portion of the AD curve shifts significantly upon impact of a
deleveraging shock.
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Figure 2.1: A deleveraging shock moves an economy from a unique inflationary to a unique secular
stagnation equilibrium.
Figure 2.2: Increasing the inflation target generates two inflationary equilibria: a target, full-
employment equilibrium and a liquidity trap equilibrium.
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stagnation equilibrium where AD2 intersects AS. The predictions of the model yields the following
two hypotheses:
H1. The economy stabilizes at the unique inflationary equilibrium in the pre-shock phase.
H2. A sufficiently large deleveraging shock will cause an economy to stabilize at the secular
stagnation equilibrium.
The mechanistic central bank is bound by the ZLB and so instead addresses secular stagnation
via inflation targeting. Suppose that the central bank raises its inflation target from its baseline
level of to Π∗ = 10% to Π∗ = 30%. This shifts the downward sloping sloping portion of the AD
curve rightward in Figure 2.2 from AD3 to AD4, guaranteeing the existence of two inflationary
equilibria: a full-employment, targeted equilibrium (where AD4 intersects the vertical portion AS)
and the liquidity trap equilibrium (where AD2 intersects the vertical portion of AS). However,
equilibration following this policy action hinges on the assumption that households are rational,
which is a particularly vulnerable assumption.7
H3. Raising the inflation target to a sufficiently high level will move an economy out of secular
stagnation stagnation to the targeted inflationary equilibrium.
We also consider the possibility that our mechanistic central bank can allow nominal interest
rates to decrease below zero. The idea of using negative rates has gained in popularity over that last
two decades as many advanced- and emerging-economy central banks find themselves constrained
by the ZLB. There is some evidence that banks may be able to succesfully employ negative rates.
Eggertson, Juelsrud, Summers, and Wold (2019) show that, under some conditions, negative nom-
inal rates are expansionary. Altavilla, Burlon, Giannetti, and Holton (2019) use Euro-area data to
show empirically that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy does not break down when
rates become negative.
Clearly, allowing our mechanistic central bank to set negative nominal rates violates Equa-
7The increase in inflation target from 10 to 30% is certainly extreme, but is necessary given our parameterization
that allows for more linearity in the households’ utility function. Nonetheless, in thinking about future policy actions
at the 2019 Jackson Hole Symposium, former Federal Reserve governor Randall Kroszner said that central bankers
were searching for a “shock and awe strategy...to make sure that markets realise they’re serious, and that they are going
to have an impact”.
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Figure 2.3: Removing the ZLB removes the kink from the AD curve, thereby eliminating the
secular stagnation equilibrium and creating instead a unique inflationary equilibrium.
tion (2.6). Removing this constraint removes the kink in the AD curve, so that AD is fully describe
by Equation (2.15). We show in Figure 2.3 that this change eliminates the unique secular stag-
nation equilibrium and recreates the full-employment equilibrium that coincides with the central
bank’s 10% inflation target. This yields the following hypothesis:
H4. Eliminating the ZLB moves an economy out of secular stagnation and back to the targeted
inflationary equilibrium.
It is unclear ex ante whether or not this should be effective. It is quite possible that such an
intervention will prove ineffective if subjects fail to fully appreciate the implications of negative in-
terest rates. Subjects’ consumption decisions may instead overreact to such an intervention, driving
an economy out of a deflationary trap to some point beyond the intended inflationary equilibrium.
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2.4 Experimental Implementation
We develop a new experimental environment to study expectations and economic decisions at
the zero lower bound. While previous experimental work on the zero lower bound focuses solely on
expectation formation, our framework will make two important contributions. First, we introduce
an unexplored secular stagnation equilibrium, expanding the set of possible research questions.
Second, our environment allows for the simultaneous study of expectations and financial decisions,
which yields a richer and more realistic environment within which researches can explore of how
policy impacts individual and aggregate outcomes. Heterogeneity in preferences toward debt and
in dynamic optimization may generate important implications for the distribution of wealth that
impact the efficacy of policy.
Laboratory experiments have the benefit of providing a controlled environment where re-
searchers can clearly observe the causal effects of new and untried policies without having po-
tentially detrimental real-world consequences. Unlike in the real world where we have only one
long history, the same debt-deleveraging and policy response scenarios can be replicated with inde-
pendent groups to evaluate the robustness of both behavior and policy. Compared to theory where
agents’ behavior is assumed, laboratory experiments allow subjects to bring their own home-grown
preferences and biases into the environment.
Laboratory experiments often come with an important trade off: a sacrifice of some external
validity in exchange for a gain in experimental control. As a matter of clearly discussing potential
limitations of our research, we briefly discuss here what we believe are the two important potential
threats to external validity: we must select a data-generating process (DGP) for our underlying
economy and a subject pool to participate in our experiment. It is possible that our DGP does not
map cleanly onto reality. It is also possible that our subjects do not behave in ways representative
of typical economic agents.
Given our research question and design, we believe this trade off is minimal and worthwhile.
Our experiments will involve financially-incentivized undergraduate students in the role of house-
holds making financial decisions for multiple generations. Undergraduate students in laboratory
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experiment have been shown to behave similarly with real world agents in markets, financial de-
cision making, and in expectation formation (Kessler and Vesterlund, 2015, Cornand and Hubert,
2018). The data-generating process will be based on EMR’s model, which has been a major ad-
vancement in capturing realistic inflation dynamics. That is, this design represents, arguably, a
more realistic economic environment than, for example, environments where interest rates cannot
remain permanently negative due to a representative discount factor. Our economic environment
subsumes the inflationary and liquidity trap equilibria present in such models, while also allowing
for a secular stagnation equilibrium to emerge.
2.4.1 Experiment
There are several goals for this experiment. First, we seek to establish whether secular stag-
nation equilibria emerge in an experimental economy driven by the combination of exogenous
demand shocks and the real decisions of economic agents. Second, we test whether unconven-
tional monetary policies such as raising the inflation target or eliminating the ZLB can effectively
stimulate inflationary expectations and aggregate demand at the ZLB. Third, we test whether these
unconventional policy can rescue economies from secular stagnation.
Each laboratory session - which is an independent economy - consists of 21 household agents
that form price forecasts and budgetary decisions in a three-period overlapping generations frame-
work. For simplicity, our design involves the automation of young and old households. The young
decisions are completely automated to ensure that the young are maximally leveraged.8 Each econ-
omy has seven undergraduate participants that make repeated budget decisions that influence the
consumption outcomes of the 14 remaining middle-aged and old households.
The experiment consists of 50 periods (30 periods in our baseline treatment where an interven-
tion is not introduced). Each period t consists of three stages.
Stage 1: All subjects simultaneously submit forecasts about the current price, Ei,tPt and sub-
8Small deviations in borrowing can produce drastically different inflation and output dynamics. In pilot experi-
ments that did not involve automated young households, we found that subjects consistently underborrow during the
early periods of their lifecycle (consistent with debt aversion observed by Meissner, 2016) which yields unstable, de-
flationary economies. We therefore automate this decision so that we create an experimental environment that allows
us to test policy prescriptions aimed at alleviating secular stagnation etc.
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sequent period price, Ei,tPt+1. Subjects also submit a qualitative forecast about the change in the
nominal interest rate relative to the previous period (increase, stay the same, decrease). Subjects
earn 2 points for correct qualitative interest rate forecasts and zero points otherwise. We incentivize
price forecasts using the following payoff function:
ForecastPointst = 2
−|EtPt−Pt| + 2−|Et−1Pt−Pt| (2.17)
Note that subjects can earn a maximum of 4 points per period for perfect price forecasts. Fore-
casting points for either forecast drop by one half for each lab dollar that a subject under or over
forecasts. This is depicted graphically in Figure 2.4
Figure 2.4: Payoff function for an individual price forecast
We elicit price and interest rate forecasts for various reasons. The efficacy of our policy in-
terventions hinges critically on whether participants form model-consistent expectations. Price
forecasts provide valuable insight into the relative importance of expectations in informing spend-
ing decisions. The median concurrent price forecast is also used to compute the expected income
and interest rates participants are likely to face in the current period. We present this information
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to participants in the subsequent phase to facilitate their spending decisions.9 While the qualitative
interest rate forecast has no impact on how the economy evolves, it allow us to assess participants’
comprehension of the central bank’s policy rule.
Stage 2: Participants play the role of a middle-aged household who makes a consumption-
saving decision after receiving predictions about their concurrent income, nominal interest rate, and
concurrent and subsequent prices. Specifically, each participant makes a decision about how much
of their current nominal income, EtYi,t to spend in period t. Any unspent income is automatically
saved and consumed in the subsequent period when the agent becomes old.
Participants earn points based on their consumption decisions while middle-aged and old. We
induce participants to behave as if they had a per-period utility function given by Ut = 5 + ln(α+
Ct) where α = 0.00673.10 Since a participant is essentially two households at any point in time
(the middle-aged agent they are actively making a decision for in period t and the old-agent that
they previously made a decision for in period t− 1), they possess two separate utility functions.
Importantly, any money saved by a middle-aged household in period t will accrue interest at
the prevailing nominal interest rate and be available to the same household in period t + 1. This
now-old household will spend all remaining wealth on output and the subject receives all utility
from this consumption of output. The timing structure is depicted graphically in Figure 3.2.
After all participants have submitted their spending decision, we use all automated young
agents and middle-aged participants’ spending decisions in period t, as well as the remaining
spending dollars of the period t old agents determined in period t − 1, to compute total period t
dollars for consumption spending. This information is used to clear markets, allocate output and
assign utility. Subjects earn points based on how much of the consumption good (output) they
purchase, on the accuracy of their price forecasts, and on the accuracy of their qualitative interest
rate forecast.
9We use a median price prediction rather than a weighted average price. This prevents subjects from coordinating
expectations to manipulate prices in any favorable way. This also mitigates the ability of any one subject to signifi-
cantly influence the economy via extreme expectations.
10This is a slight modification of the utility function to allow for the possibility that subjects consume zero output
without facing exponentially negative payoffs. We select α such that U(Ct) = 0 when Ct = 0.
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Figure 2.5: Co-determination of middle-aged and old spending
Stage 3: The third phase is for participants to review the outcomes of the current period. All
participants observe the total amount of output produced, price of output, nominal interest rate, as
well as their own current spending decision and the amount of points earned from consumption.
We provide a history of all aggregate-level variables to all subjects in all periods (following the
first period) during both stages of each period. Additionally, the central bank informs all subjects
of its policy rule and its current inflation target during both stages of each period.
We convert experimental points into real dollars at a rate of 20-to-1. The use of monetary
incentives in the experiment reflects the position of the economics profession that experimental
studies generalize to situations outside of the laboratory only if subjects’ decisions have a direct
and significant influence on their compensation.
We provide subjects with two tools to facilitate play. The first tool, available in Stage 1 of
each period, allows subjects to convert inflation expectations into price expectations or to convert
price expectations into inflation expectations. We do this so that subjects can easily incorporate
both inflation and price information when forming price forecasts. The second tool, available in
Stage 2, takes as inputs a subjects’ price expectations and returns to them a suggested level of
spending conditional on their individual price expectations. We note to subjects in our instructions
that this suggested level of spending is conditional on their expectations and also inform them that
they may enter any strictly positive number for their expectations. They are beholden to neither
the price prediction provided in Stage 1 nor the median price predictions displayed to them on the
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Figure 2.6: Stage 1 Screen
Stage 2 screen. Finally, we also provide subjects with a full history of aggregate outcomes and
individual decisions on all screens of the game. For examples, refer to the screen shots depicted in
Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7.
We face the non-trivial challenge of simultaneously clearing markets and allowing young
agents to borrow from future uncertain income. EMR assume rational expectations to assuage
these thorny issues. We follow their approach by relying on subject-provided expectations to
provide income, price, and interest rate signals which can inform participants’ decisions before
markets are cleared. We couple subjects’ expectations with a novel pricing algorithm to determine
aggregate spending, price, wage, output, labor demand, and interest rate.
We develop and implement an algorithm built on numerical methods for solving the pricing
equation. This is necessary because there is no analytical solution for prices, given the structure of
this self-referential model. We solve for prices within our framework as follows:
For the program, we define the per-period, market-clearing price as:
Pt =




Figure 2.7: Stage 2 Screen
This gives us the following piece-wise, per-period price function:
Pt =
CY + CM + CO
Y f
, Π ≥ 1 (2.19)
Pt =
CY + CM + CO
Yt
, Π < 1. (2.20)
We proceed by first supposing that prices are determined by Equation (2.20), which can be
rewritten as
Pt =


















However, we know that per-period wages wt are also a function of Pt since we have that
wt = max(PtαL
α−1







t = (CY + CM + CO)
1−α
α wtα




C = (CY + CM + CO)
1−α
α α−1.




ii. A = C(1− γ)αLα−1





t − A] = B. (2.25)
We solve this via the Newton-Raphson method of numerical approximation.
For example, suppose f(Pt) = P b+1t − APt − B = 0 and define an initial guess for our price
as X0 = Pt−1 and some stopping rule predicated upon meeting some minimum error rate φ. Then,
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if f(X0) ≤ φ the algorithm stops and Pt ≈ Pt−1. Otherwise, if f(X0) > φ the algorithm proceeds
as follows:




P b+1t−1 APt−1 −B
(b+ 1)P bt−1 − A
Once the algorithm arrives at some Xi such that f(Xi) ≤ φ, define a temporary price as
Pt ≈ Xi.
Finally, we calculate output given this price and aggregate spending. If output exceeds potential
then we know that our assumption that Equation (2.20) determines prices in a given period is
incorrect, and the algorithm instead sets prices according to Equation (2.19).
Below we summarize how the Young, Middle-Aged, and Old households’ spending decisions
are computed.
The Young: We automate young households such that young household i in period t will auto-
matically borrow a proportion Dit ∈ [0, 1] of its middle-aged income. This is clearly problematic
since the middle-aged income of these agents is not actually determined until markets clear in the
following period. However, EMR’s assumption of rational expectations circumvents this issue in
theory. If subjects’ expectations are rational, then there should be no difference in expected and
realized prices. Thus, we compute the consumption expenditure of a Young household i in period
t as ci,yt = DitEt{Pt+1} = DitEt[Y
i,m
t+1 ].
The Middle-Aged: Subjects make budgeting decisions as Middle-aged households in stage 2 of
each period. Subjects here have two considerations: a debt-repayment obligation incurred automat-
ically by the household when young and a consumption/savings decision. However, our subjects
face these considerations before income is actually determined. To deal with this, we suppose that
the income of Middle-aged households is equivalent to the market expectation for current period
prices. If we again suppose that we are in period t = 0 then middle-aged income is given as
E0{P0}. Thus, a Middle-aged subject has net income ni = E0{P0}cj1(1 + i1). Suppose αj is
the proportion of net income allocated to savings so that cj,m0 = αj(E0{P0}c
j
1(1 + i1)). We can
then use cj,m0 for market clearing, which finally informs us how much money Middle-aged agents
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actually earn. One issue here is that if subjects systematically deviate from RE then we can have
that E0{P0} > P0 or E0{P0} < P0. Because we have already cleared markets using a consump-
tion level based on the market-expected price, we occasionally must adjust for deviations from RE
by changing the amount of money that these middle-aged agents hold in savings for consumption
while old. This is because deviations from RE (and from the correspond consumption/savings
decision) can drive a wedge between expected and realized savings for middle-aged agents. If
we call t expected savings of middle-aged agent j as E0{sm,j0 } then E0{P0} > P0 would cause
Ej,0{sj,m0 } > s
m,j
0 and opposite for the opposite case.
The Old: The decision for a given old household in period t is determined by the budgeting deci-
sion of a subject acting as a middle-aged household in period t− 1. Old households automatically
spend all remaining wealth on output. For example, if a subject i assigned a Middle-aged house-





t−1(1 + it−1) to consumption dollars.
11 Note then that subjects, anytime follow-
ing period 1, earn consumption points from a currently-assigned Middle-aged household and an
Old household. This Old household is the Middle-aged household assigned to that subject in the
previous period.12
2.4.2 Treatments
We conduct a series of treatments to explore the learnability and stability of different equi-
libria with and without policy action. We initialize all sessions at the unique full-employment
equilibrium where we assume, for steady state values, that the economy is operating along the
steady state inflation path. A surprise exogenous deleveraging shock moves the borrowing con-
straint from D = .35 to Dshock = .3 13 to create a unique secular stagnation equilibrium. Our
interest is in the ability of different unconventional monetary policy actions to move the experi-
mental economies out of secular stagnation and back to a full-employment equilibrium. Monetary
11Here, ct represents units of output and s
m,i
t−1 is the dollar amount saved by agent i in period t−1 while middle-aged.
12We automate Old households in period 1 based on the assumption that the economy moved along the steady-state
inflation path in all periods before the start of our experiment.
13In our baseline treatment (Baseline), which does not feature a policy intervention, we set Dshock = .28.
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policy interventions include raising the inflation target and allowing a negative nominal interest
rate. Raising the inflation target generates multiple equilibria: a secular stagnation equilibrium, a
liquidity trap equilibrium, and the targeted, high-inflation equilibrium. Removing the ZLB elim-
inates the upward sloping portion of the aggregate demand curve so that AD is fully describe by
Equation (2.15). In theory, allowing for negative nominal rates can fully offset the deleveraging
shock and stimulate aggregate demand sufficiently to recreate a unique inflationary equilibrium
that coincides with the central bank’s inflation target.
We use πtgt, πss, πlt to denote an inflationary steady state equilibrium, a secular stagnation
steady state equilibrium, and a liquidity trap equilibrium, respectively.
2.4.2.1 Baseline
Baseline explores the ability of subjects to coordinate on the unique equilibria when they exist.
This treatment features 30 periods of play divided into a 15-period pre-shock phase and a 15-
period post-shock phase. The pre-shock phase features a unique equilibrium of π=10% with full-
employment and output. This is followed by a deleveraging shock in period 16 that moves Dt =
.35 to Dshockt = .28, which creates a unique secular stagnation equilibrium of π
ss = −24.4% with
labor rationing and output well below potential. We announce the deleveraging shock to subjects
at the beginning of period 16 before the begin stage 1. This announcement informs subjects about
the deleveraging shock, the magnitude of this shock, a brief explanation of how it impacts the
economy, and informs subjects that the shock is permanent. Further, all subjects know that all
other subjects know about the shock.
2.4.2.2 Policy treatments
Each subsequent treatment embeds Baseline, with the caveat that shocks in HigherTarget and
NegativeIR are such that Dt = .35 to Dshockt = .3.
HigherTarget This treatment features 50 periods of play divided into three phases. The first two
phases are fully described by Baseline. The third phase begins when the central bank announces
the change to its inflation target in the beginning of period 30. The higher inflation target generates
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an environment with three equilibria: a secular stagnation, a liquidity trap, and a new targeted
inflationary equilibrium. The policy intervention is announced on screen and aloud so that all
subjects know that all subjects know about the policy change.
NegativeIR This treatment again involves three phases where the first two phases are fully de-
scribed by Baseline. Phases 3 begins following removal of the ZLB in period 30. Doing this
removes the kink point in the AS curve, creating a unique, inflationary equilibrium that coin-
cides with the central bank’s inflation target. The policy intervention is announced aloud and
accompanied by a single-page document that provides an example to help subjects understand the
implications of negative interest rates.
We summarize the treatment parameterization in Table 2.1 below.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Baseline πtgt = 10% πss = −24.7% N/A
HigherTarget πtgt = 10% πss = −18.3% πtgt = 30%, πss = −18.3%, πlt = 16.7%
NegativeIR πtgt = 10% πss = −18.3% πtgt = 10%
Table 2.1: Parameterized equilibria across treatments and phases
2.5 Results
We begin with results from Baseline, where we initialize our experimental economies with a
unique inflationary equilibrium and then replace this with unique secular stagnation equilibrium
via a sharp deleveraging shock. Results for this treatment are shown in Figure 2.8. This figure
plots individual inflation expectations, the median inflation expectation, aggregate inflation (top
panel), and individual consumption demand (bottom panel) from each Baseline session. Note that
each session-level graph is split into two phases: a pre-shock phase and a post-shock phase. The
vertical, dashed line denotes the period of the deleveraging shock and the two horizontal lines
denote the pre-shock, full-employment and the post-shock, secular stagnation equilibrium levels
of inflation (top panel) and consumption (bottom panel).
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In four of the eight sessions, the economies appear to be converging to the steady state equi-
librium in the pre-shock phase of each session. This is particularly impressive given that, as we
discuss later in the results section, the overwhelming majority of subjects abstain from simply fore-
casting the central bank’s inflation target in each period and instead adapt a forecasting heuristic
that involves updating as a function of recent economic outcomes. The deleveraging shock, which
occurs in period 15, consistently generates deflation. However, not all economies completely con-
verge to the secular stagnation equilibrium following this shock. Instead, we see varying degrees
of deflation emerge ranging from mild deflation to severe deflation at the secular stagnation equi-
librium. The inability of economies to completely converge to the secular stagnation is most often
attributable to over-consumption that emerges once subjects begin to experience deflation (see
Figure 2.10). That is, we find evidence of a Pigou effect (Patinkin, 1948), whereby deflationary
episodes are quelled by a wealth effect generated by increasing real wealth balances.
The economies in sessions 3 and 6, however, experience rampant inflation. This is driven by
a confluence of highly optimistic expectations and very large spending shocks. This is striking
given that the central bank pursues an aggressive policy response to inflation and is unrestrained in
adjusting its policy rate upwards. In fact, as expectations remain anchored despite increasing rates,
we eventually see that pursuing a Taylor-type rule reinforces rather than dampens this inflationary
pressure. The lack of responsiveness of the economy to the high interest rate suggests that the
wealth effect strongly dominates the substitution effect for participants.
Worth noting in Figure 2.8 is how consumption changes in response to the deleveraging shock.
Session 8 gives a nice example. Though consumption is relatively well anchored in phase 1 of
each session, we see that the deleveraging shock and subsequent deflationary pressure drastically
increases consumption heterogeneity, which suggests that such shocks reduce aggregate welfare
but the decrease in welfare is larger for some than others. This pattern emerges in most of our
experimental economies.
Figure 2.9 follows the same conventions as Figure 2.8 but plots the nominal interest rate rather
than nominal inflation. We see here that the central bank is constrained by the zero lower bound
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Figure 2.8: Aggregate inflation by session for Baseline
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Figure 2.9: Nominal interest rates by session for Baseline
almost immediately following a deleveraging shock. Nevertheless, this drastic reduction in interest
rates does little to stimulate aggregate demand.
Additionally, we examine consumption demand aggregated across phases one and two of Base-
line. We show this in Figure 2.10, which plots the cumulative density function (CDF) for aggregate
demand of all participants across all periods for phases one and two of Baseline. The two verti-
cal lines denote optimal consumption demand for an individual under rational expectations. The
leftmost vertical line denotes optimal post-shock consumption while the rightmost line denotes
optimal pre-shock consumption. The dashed density line is the post-shock CDF.
There are several things worth noting in Figure 2.10. First, we see that in Phase 1 of Baseline,
our subjects, on average, consume approximately optimally relative to a fully rational economic
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Figure 2.10: Nominal interest rates by session for Baseline
agent. Further, we see that post-shock consumption is much higher than that predicted, which is
the predominant reason that some economies do not converge fully to the secular stagnation equi-
librium. This pattern of over consumption following a deleveraging shock emerges consistently
across treatments.
HigherTarget embeds Baseline and explores aggressive inflation targeting as a method of
pulling an economy from secular stagnation. We show results from this treatment in Figure 2.11.
We split HigherTarget session into three phases (from left to right): a pre-shock phase, a post-shock
phase, and a post-intervention phase. Vertical dashed lines denote the timing of the deleveraging
shock and the central bank’s policy intervention, respectively. Horizontal lines denote equilibrium
inflation and consumption levels. Note that phase 3 of HigherTarget features three horizontal lines.
These correspond to the three equilibria depicted above in Figure 3. The top orange line is the full-
employment equilibrium that coincides with the central bank’s new inflation target, the grey dashed
line (middle line in phase 3) denotes the liquidity trap equilibrium, and the solid bottom green line
denotes the secular stagnation equilibrium.
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Figure 2.11: Aggregate inflation dynamics by session for HigherTarget
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Again, subjects in this setting do a good job of playing the inflationary equilibrium and we
see that the deleveraging shock generates pessimistic expectations and deflationary pressure on the
individual economies. Following deflationary episodes generated by the deleveraging shock, our
mechanistic central bank attempts to address secular stagnation by increasing its inflation target.
The idea here is that this new inflation target will generate optimistic, inflationary expectations
that will fuel spending. This expectations-driven increase in demand in turn increases the borrow-
ing and spending capacity of the Young and Middle-aged households through increased expected
nominal income.
The increase in the inflation target ubiquitously fails to return the economies to the desired,
full-employment equilibrium. Instead, we observe in most economies that inflation reacts very
little to the increase in the inflation target. In economies where there is some initial reaction to the
announcement/target increase (sessions 1, 2, and 5), there is a slow but steady collapse in inflation
expectations and inflation, and a subsequent return to the secular stagnation equilibrium.
Also noteworthy is that some economies in the post-intervention environment do manage to
mitigate deflation by coordinating on zero inflation. Zero inflation often becomes a focal point
for our economies, despite not being part of the set of predicted rational expectations equilibria.
However, we find that the result of over-consumption that begins after subjects have experienced
prolonged deflation. Coordination on zero-percent inflation has the effect of trivializing price
forecasts for subjects and greatly reducing the complexity of the two-period optimization problem
subjects face in stage 2 of each period.
As was true in Figure 2.8, we see a considerable increase in consumption heterogeneity follow-
ing the deleveraging shock. Worth noting here is that increasing the inflation target does little to
coordinate inflation expectations on the central banks target and also has little coordinating effect
on consumption.
We see in Figure 2.12 that nominal rates in this economy often exhibit quite a bit of volatil-
ity pre-shock, which yields relatively stable pre-shock inflation dynamics. And as was true in
Baseline, we see that almost all of our economies converge almost immediately to the zero lower
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Figure 2.12: Nominal interest rates by session for HigherTarget
bound following our deleveraging shock. We see that from each of our economies14, regardless of
post-intervention dynamics, remains constrained at the zero lower bound post intervention.
We also consider consumption dynamics for HigherTarget, which we show in Figure 2.13. This
graph is similar to the consumption graph from Baseline. However, we now display three density
lines and three vertical lines depicting optimal consumption levels under rational expectations for
each of the three phases of HigherTarget. The three vertical lines denote optimal levels (from left
to right) for post-shock consumption, pre-shock consumption, and post-intervention consumption.
The solid and dashed density lines depict the CDFs of phase 1 and phase 2 consumption, respec-
tively. The dashed-and-dotted density curve depicts the CDF of post-intervention consumption.
14Aside from session 3.
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Figure 2.13: CDFs of consumption for all subjects in all periods of HigherTarget
As was true in Baseline, we see in Figure 2.13 that, on average, subjects consume optimally in
Phase 1 but over consume in Phase 2. We also see in Figure 2.13 that subjects under consume in
Phase 3, which is driven at least in part by the inability of the central bank to re-anchor expectations
on its higher inflation target. In additional to low demand of Middle-aged driven by pessimistic ex-
pectations, this sub-optimal demand is also driven by Young households borrowing against future
income that is much lower than is theoretically predicted under rational expectations.
NegativeIR also embeds Baseline. However, the central bank in these experimental economies
now intervenes by permanently removing the ZLB in an effort to stimulate inflation expectations
and increase aggregate demand in the hopes of returning the stagnating economies to the full-
employment equilibrium. Results from this treatment are shown in Figure 2.14.
As in HigherTarget, the central bank’s policy intervention occurs at the beginning of period
30. There are two key differences between NegativeIR and HigherTarget. First, in NegativeIR
there exists only a single inflationary equilibrium following the central bank’s intervention. This
equilibrium coincides with the central bank’s inflation target of 10%. Second, the key mechanism
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Figure 2.14: Aggregate inflation dynamics by session for NegativeIR
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Figure 2.15: Nominal interest rates by session for NegativeIR
pushing the experimental economies out of secular stagnation in NegativeIR is a negative nominal
interest rate that stimulates aggregate demand by increasing the appeal of current consumption
relative to future consumption. That is, there is relatively less reliance on rational expectations to
stimulate spending.
Eliminating the ZLB consistently stimulates aggregate spending and stabilizes our experimen-
tal economies at the targeted full-employment equilibrium. Though our experimental economy is
devoid of some features that might reveal downsides to such an intervention (an ability for bank
runs, for example) there is scope for agents to either misunderstand the implication of negative
rates or, conversely, to experience a more severe wealth effect from negative interest rates and cut
their spending further. We do not observe evidence of either
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Figure 2.16: CDFs of consumption for all subjects and all periods for NegativeIR
Looking at Figure 2.15 gives a sense of the magnitude of negative rates used by the central
bank to return these experimental economies to the full-employment equilibrium. We see in each
experimental economy that nominal rates drop significantly in the intervention period and then
revert almost instantly to a level much closer to zero. However, it is clear that, for most economies,
the central bank is only capable of supporting the full-employment equilibrium by maintaining
negative rates.
Figure 2.16 shows CDFs of consumption demand for NegativeIR. As was true with Baseline
and HigherTarget, we again see that subjects consume optimally on average in Phase 1 and over
consume in Phase 2. Now, unlike in HigherTarget, we see that consumption in Phase 3 is, on
average, optimal. However, like in Phase 1 of all treatments, we see a large amount of heterogeneity
in consumption.
We now evaluate the convergence of the economies, for each phase, to the predicted equilibria.
In Phase 1, the predicted steady state inflation rate is 10%. We fail to reject H1 that inflation
reached this level in Baseline and NegativeIR (Wilcoxon signed rank tests, p = 0.26 (N=8) in
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Baseline, p = 0.13 (N=7) in NegativeIR.) In HigherTarget, inflation is slightly but significantly
above the equilibrium at 13.2% (p = 0.05, N=9).
We hypothesized in H2 that large deleveraging shocks would inflation to stabilize at the secular
stagnation equilibrium. We compare the mean inflation in the final five periods of Phase 2 to the
equilibrium prediction of -24.4% inflation (in sessions that reached period 25). We reject H2
that the economies have converged to the secular stagnation equilibrium (Wilcoxon signed rank
tests, p = 0.03 (N=6) in Baseline , p = 0.008 (N=9) in HigherTarget, and p = 0.018 (N=7) in
NegativeIR.)
We also hypothesized that raising the inflation target to a sufficiently high level will move an
economy to the targeted inflationary equilibrium of 30%. We compute the mean inflation in Phase
3 of HigherTarget after period 40. Mean inflation in Phase 3 after period 40 is -4.3%. We reject
H3 that the economies converge to the new target inflationary equilibrium (Wilcoxon signed rank
test, p = 0.018 (N=7)).
Finally, we hypothesized that eliminating the ZLB would return the economies in NegativeIR
to their targeted inflationary equilibrium of 10%. Again, we compute the mean inflation in Phase
3 of NegativeIR after period 40. Across all sessions, mean inflation is 8.01%. We fail to reject
H4 that the economies converge to the original inflationary equilibrium (Wicoxon signed rank test,
p = 0.31 (N=7)).
Next, we can assess how the shocks and interventions alter the heterogeneity in subjects’ fore-
casting heuristics. The different heuristic models we consider are listed below in Table 2.2. We
focus our analysis on the forecasts related to concurrent inflation.
Model Class Heuristic Name Model
M1 Target Ei,tπt = π∗t
M2 Naive Inflation Ei,tπt = πt−1
M3 Constant Gain Ei,tπt = Et−1πt−1 + γ(Ei,t−1πt−1 − πt−1)
M4 Trend-chasing Ei,tπt = πt−1 + τ(πt−1 − πt−2)
M5 Naive Price Ei,tPt = Pt−1
Table 2.2: Inflation forecasting heuristics
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M1 Target assumes that a subject bases her price forecast on the assumption that inflation today
will equal the central bank’s inflation target. Given the non-stochastic nature of the environment,
this is a rational expectations equilibrium. M2 Naive Inflation assumes that a subject bases her
price forecast on the assumption that inflation today will equal inflation yesterday. M3 Constant
Gain assumes that a subject forms a price forecast today by updating yesterday’s inflation expecta-
tion based on yesterday’s inflation expectation error. Given this formulation, we consider a range
of parameterizations of γ ∈ [−1.5,−0.1]. M4 Trend-chasing assumes that a subject’s inflation
forecast is an extrapolation of yesterday’s inflation based on the recent trend in inflation. Given
this formulation, we consider a range of parameterizations τ ∈ [0.1, 1.5]. M5 Naive Price assumes
that a subject forms a price expectation today based solely on yesterday’s price.
We classify a subject by comparing, in each period, her price (or implied inflation) expectation
for today to the price forecast arising from each of M1-M5. We then calculate the mean abso-
lute error for each hypothetical heuristic (and for each parameter value for M3, M4) and classify
participants as belonging to the heuristic that has the minimum RMSE.15
EMR’s theory assumes that subjects are perfectly rational when forming price expectations.
This, ex ante, seemed like an extreme assumption that could possibly form a wedge that would
prevent the predictions of this model from mapping into reality. This assumption was relaxed by
Gibbs (2017) who shows that the predictions of this are E-stable and thus survive, under a form of
least squares learning.
We observe consistent heuristics in Phase 1 of all treatments. Trend-chasing is the dominant
heuristic capturing 43-61% of participants’ forecasting behavior. Forecasting according to the
central bank’s target and constant-gain heuristics describe a small minority of participants. We do
not observe purely naive inflation forecasts, and only a small number of participants who forecast
prices naively.
The deleveraging shock at the beginning of Phase 2 generates significant heterogeneity in
heuristics, with all five classes of heuristics represented. Usage of the central bank’s target de-
15Note that M3 is equivalent to M2 for γ = −1. In the case that participants were classified in both, we assign their
type to be M2 Naive Inflation.
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TYPE TO ENTER A CAPTION.Figure 2.17: Forecasting heuristics by phase and by treatment
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clines in all three treatments (from 34% to 12% in Baseline, 16% to 6.3% in HigherTarget, and
27% to 2% in NegativeIR), and is rational as the target is no longer an equilibrium outcome. Note
that neither the liquidity trap or secular stagnation equilibria are focal points for participants. This
is because we did not inform them of these equilibrium values. Nonetheless, participants’ ex-
pectations do not adjust in line with these equilibria. Rather, constant-gain learning becomes the
dominant heuristic as participants grapple with forecasting in an unfamiliar environment. This
comes at a significant reduction in trend-chasing heuristics.
Increasing the inflation target in Phase 3 does not increase the share of participants using the
central bank’s target (the share falls to 0%). That is, no participant perceived the central bank’s
new inflation target of 30% as credible. The most striking change is the increase in share of
participants simply forecasting based on last period’s price, i.e. forecast zero percent inflation. We
observe the proportion of naive price forecasts increase from 2.6% in Phase 2 to 27% in Phase 3,
consistent with increased confusion about the environment. Trend-chasing heuristics also become
more prevalent, with their share of the population rising from 11% in Phase 2 to 29% in Phase 3.
When the central bank eliminates the ZLB in NegativeIR more participants are willing to utilize
the central bank’s 10% inflation target as their forecast. This is still less than what we observe in
Phase 1, suggesting that some of the credibility loss associated with the experience at the ZLB is
permanent. The distribution of forecasting heuristics otherwise appears quite comparable to that
of HigherTarget.
2.6 Conclusion
We experimentally investigate the ability of unconventional monetary policies to alleviate sec-
ular stagnation at the zero lower bound. Using the overlapping generations structure of Eggertsson,
Mehrotra, Robbins (2019) as the model for our experimental economy, we find that EMR’s model
is robust to deviations from rationality along several dimensions. We find that the equilibria pre-
dicted by this model obtain even when economic agents form expectations using heuristics that
are much less sophisticated than rational expectations and least-squares learning as explored by
Gibbs (2017). High inflation equilibrium equilibria are relatively robust to deviations away from
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optimal consumption profiles. However, systematic over-consumption driven by Pigouvian wealth
effects can prevent an economy reaching the secular stagnation equilibrium following a deleverag-
ing shock.
We find that deleveraging shocks consistently produce results that qualitatively match the
model’s description and, across all treatments, often triggers secular stagnation. However, central
bank interventions via inflation targeting consistently fails to pull economies out of deflationary
traps. This result is consistent with Arifovic and Petersen (2017) who find that neither qualitative
nor quantitative communication of higher inflation targets in a liquidity trap is sufficient to stimu-
late inflation expectations in a learning-to-forecast experimental environment. Removing the zero
lower bound and allowing interest rates to become negative, on the other hand, reliably returns our
experimental economies to the full-employment, inflationary equilibria. Our results suggest that
policies aimed at stimulating aggregate demand through increased real wealth balances are more
effective than those relying on rational expectations.
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3. CENTRAL BANK DENSITY FORECASTS: DO HIGHER-ORDER MOMENTS
MATTER?
Central banking has undergone a decades-long transparency revolution that brought about an
increased reliance on communication to manage the expectations of economic agents to achieve
policy objectives (Blinder et al., 2008). Communication is a particularly important tool whenever
policy rates are constrained at the effective lower bound, which has been the case in the past
decade across the world. Arguably, the first link in the context of monetary policy transmission is
the effect of the communications on the market interest rates which are relevant for consumption
and investment decisions in the economy — a topic we study in this paper. More specifically, we
characterize the evolution of economic outlook across the monetary policy cycle and quantify the
effects on the market interest rates and survey forecasts.
A primary component of a central bank’s communication strategy is its projections of the
key macroeconomic variables, including inflation and output. These summarize the conditions
to which a central bank is reacting through its policy instruments. Many central banks publish
density forecasts alongside their point predictions, conveying the central bank’s uncertainty and
outlook on the balance of risks. The Bank of England (BoE) was the first to publish ‘fan charts’ of
its macroeconomic projections in 1998, which is now standard practice across the board.
There is a wide literature on monetary policy communication, mainly focusing on the publi-
cation of point forecasts. The main conclusion of this literature is that communication facilitates
policy and acts as a coordination device for expectation formation. Swanson (2006), Blinder et al.
(2008), Hubert (2014, 2015) support this finding with empirical analyses, while Kryvtsov and Pe-
tersen (2020) and Ahrens et al. (2019) provide experimental support. There is further evidence that
central bank communication affects the market interest rates (see Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson,
2004 and Andrade and Ferroni, 2020 among others), making it relevant for policymaking. The
communication of economic outlook has also proven to be important under the information chan-
nel of monetary policy discussed in seminal works of Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) and as well
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as Miranda-Agrippino and Ricco (2018), Hubert (2019), Hoesch et al. (2020), among others.
Though the literature on central bank communication is rather extensive, the use of density
forecasts and the information they contain has been rather scant. By observing the various central
bank behaviors, it also seems that there is no consensus in policy circles on what the communica-
tion of uncertainty delivers. As Petersen and Rholes (2020) point out, with the COVID-19 crises
the central banks around the world have moved to different directions — for example, both the
Federal Reserve and the BoE abandoned predictive densities in exchange for scenario analysis at
the onset of the pandemic. On the other hand, in the April 2020 Monetary Policy Report, the Bank
of Canada rid itself of point predictions and instead published only ranges. Some central banks,
such as the European Central Bank, made no change to their communication strategy. The sec-
ond interesting observation is that communication of uncertainty appears to be deemed important
since, over time, the central banks are moving to a more timely release of that information. For
instance, per Reuters article on November 5, 2020 “The Federal Reserve will publish new color
around policymaker outlooks for interest rates and the economy, and release some details earlier,
changes that could give fresh insight into rate-setting decisions ... [the changes should] provide a
timely perspective on the risks or uncertainties that surround the modal or baseline projections,”
Powell said, “thereby highlighting some of the risk management considerations that are relevant
for monetary policy.” The heterogeneity in nature of central bank projections throughout the cur-
rent global pandemic highlights the lack of consensus about when, how, or why to use predictive
densities. Thus, it is not obvious how or even if information regarding risk and uncertainty con-
tained in density forecasts matters from a policy perspective, even though density forecasts could
conceivably influence financial markets and economic activity.
Despite this widespread publication of density forecasts, there is very limited evidence on how
higher-order moments matter from a policy perspective. Rholes and Petersen (2020) show exper-
imentally that communicating uncertainty alongside a point projection of inflation can increase
individual-level forecast errors and forecast uncertainty relative to communicating only point pro-
jections. Hubert and Maule (2020) show empirically that private expectations respond strongly
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to the BoE’s signals about future economic activity as conveyed in its Quarterly Inflation Re-
port (QIR), suggesting that density forecasts might operate through a signaling channel. Hansen,
McMahon, and Tong (2019) uses textual analysis of the BoE’s QIR to show that the economic
uncertainty conveyed by text (and which is orthogonal to information conveyed numerically at the
2-year forecast horizon) can have increasingly large effects along the yield curve. Further, the
heterogeneity in the nature of central bank projections throughout the current global pandemic
highlights the lack of consensus about when, how, or why to use predictive densities. Thus, it is
not obvious how or even if information regarding risk and uncertainty contained in density fore-
casts matters from a policy perspective, even though density forecasts could conceivably influence
financial markets and economic activity.
The goal of this paper is to characterize and understand whether and how the financial markets
and private sector expectations respond to the revisions of higher-order moments of the economic
outlook. We use the data from the BoE because the BoE provides the longest time-series of rele-
vant data for an empirical study. We rely on a high-frequency identification approach, taking the
revisions from one publication to the next, announced on a specific calendar day to identify the
effects of central bank economic outlook (revisions) on the UK term structure of interest rates and
the expectations of professional forecasters. The paper closest to our work is Hansen et al. (2019)
who use textual analysis as well as density forecast updates to understand the long interest rate sen-
sitivity to macroeconomic news (relative to the short end of the yield curve). The main difference
between their work and ours is that we differentiate between uncertainty and skewness to better
understand the various properties that are typically important in considering density forecasts.
We find that revisions to higher-order moments matter more than revisions to first-order mo-
ments for interest rate dynamics. In fact, there is not much action due to the first moment move-
ments. On the other hand, an increase in the higher moments of output growth densities inverts
the yield curve, typically known to forecast a recession. On the other hand,an increase in inflation
uncertainty does not seem to affect the financial markets much, while skewness appears to be im-
portant. Moreover, the effect of higher moments is state-dependent — uncertainty revisions play
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through in expansions, while skewness revisions provide informative signals in contractions. His-
torical decomposition suggests yields have responded to higher-order moments for many decades,
and the response was strong during the financial crisis.
When looking at the Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, we find that the three-, six- and twelve-
month ahead consensus forecasts (and forecast disagreement) of short- and long-term interest rates
are strongly correlated with revisions to uncertainty, while revisions to the balance of risks, ex-
pressed through revisions to skewness, are not.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our key data sets and our data transfor-
mations and introduces the institutional details for the BoE communication through the monetary
policy cycle. Section 3 lays out our identifying assumptions and estimation strategy. Section 4
presents our findings while Section 5 concludes.
3.1 Data
The BoE’s nine-person Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) began publishing density forecasts,
termed ’fan charts’, of inflation, output growth, and unemployment in its QIR in 1997.1 The MPC,
which adheres to an inflation-targeting regime adopted in the U.K. 1993, publishes fan charts to
convey the inherent uncertainty surrounding its economic outlook and to provide its collective
outlook on the balance of risks. These fan charts present deciles of subjective estimates of the
probability distribution of the Bank’s forecast of each of these key macroeconomic variables (Eler,
2005; Mitchell and Weale, 2019).2 We provide an example of these projections for GDP growth,
inflation, and unemployment in Figure 3.1.
The MPC constructs its fan charts using a split-normal distribution with a common mode but
two different variances.3 The BoE’ particular representation centers the distribution at the mode
(µ) with an uncertainty (σ2), while the skewness (ξ) controls the relative behavior of the two halves
of the distribution. Thus, the probability density function (pdf), f(x), is given by
1The BoE, in conjunction with the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, began publishing a measure
of uncertainty surrounding inflation forecasts as early as February 1996.
2The QIR itself includes graphical depictions of these fan charts. However, the BoE makes available the numerical
information used to construct these fan charts at www.bankofengland.co.uk.
3These values are identical whenever the distribution is symmetric about the mode, which will equal the mean.
57
(a) Inflation (b) Output Growth (c) Unemployment Rate












, x ≥ µ
(3.1)
where the following definitions hold
• σ2 = (1 + γ)σ21 = (1− γ)σ22,
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and parameter values are specific to forecast horizons and forecast date. That is, the MPC
assigns potentially unique values of σ, γ for each forecasting horizon at each time t. For example,
when forecasting period t+ k while in period t, the MPC sets values of σt,t+k, γt,t+k for k ∈ K ≡
{1, 2, ..., K}, where σt,t+k, σt,t+j, j, k ∈ K can differ and σt,t+k, σ(t−l),(t+k+l) can differ.
Our focus in this paper is on how both the UK’s yield curve and private expectations respond
to revisions to the BoE’s outlook on uncertainty (σ, the second central moment) and risk (γ, the
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third central moment).4 For comparative purposes, we also consider how yields and expectations
respond to revisions of the point forecasts (µ, the first central moment).
An intuitive way to think of σ is as the uncertainty surrounding the MPCs point projections
of some key economic variable. Visually, an increase in this parameter creates a more diffuse set
of uncertainty bands surrounding the MPC’s point projection5 One can think of γ as a measure of
the MPC’s subjective outlook on the balance of risks associated with some key economic variable.
Whenever γ = 0, the split-normal density function reduces to the pdf of the normal distribution.
Positive values of γ indicate that upside risk dominates downside risk. Visually, this would mean
the MPC’s density forecast is positively-skewed. The opposite is true for negative values of γ.6
To get a sense of how the MPC sets σ, γ, and how its approach might have changed over time,
we consider the MPC’s outlook on uncertainty and risk surrounding both the 2008 collapse of
Lehman Brothers and the 2016 ‘Brexit’ referendum.
When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, the firm held more than
$700 billion in liabilities, which obviates why the failure of Lehman’s shocked global financial
markets. The MPC addressed Lehman’s collapse directly in its QIR in November 2008: "A num-
ber of institutional failures, and in particular, the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15 September,
led to rising anxieties about the survival of other financial institutions internationally." This sense
of ‘rising anxieties’ is reflected by the MPC’s upward revision of GDP growth and inflation uncer-
tainty measures at all forecast horizons in its 2008Q4 inflation report, which we show in Figure 3.3.
The MPC responded to this event by revising its balance of risks so that its density forecasts of
GDP growth and inflation were exactly symmetric.
Less than a decade later, on June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom’s electorate voted to leave the
European Union. The MPC expressed concern that the vote to leave the EU generated considerable
economic uncertainty and argued in the August 2016 QIR that short- and medium-term output
growth would fall as a consequence. Additionally, the MPC focused on the devaluation of the
4γ is the difference between the mean µ and the mode of the distribution.
5Note that σ is equal to the standard deviation whenever the distribution is symmetric (i.e. γ = 0)
6Wallis (2004) provides a more in-depth discussion of the BoE’s density forecast.
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pound sterling and the prospect of ensuing supply constraints. These concerns prompted the MPC
to increase its level of forecast uncertainty about GDP growth, relative to its May 2016 report.
Regarding inflation, the MPC made clear that the declining exchange rate was a secondary concern
relative to impending supply constraints and dampened growth projections. The MPC, charged
with maintaining full output and price stability, faced a trade-off between an inflationary policy and
recessionary pressures. Ultimately, the MPC declared a willingness to endure temporary inflation
above its 2% target to boost demand and supply to avoid larger declines in output growth. Thus,
the MPC decided to cut the policy rate by 25 basis points following the electorates vote to leave
the EU. These considerations and the MPC’s policy action is reflected by the MPC’s decision to
leave unchanged its GDP growth skewness parameters while increasing skewness parameters for
its short- and medium-term inflation forecast.
3.1.1 Timing
The MPC sets policy monthly and conveys its economic outlook quarterly (in February, May,
August, and November) in its QIR. From November 1997 through May 2015, the BoE published
the QIR one week after announcing information about that month’s monetary policy decision.
Since August of 2015, the BoE has released information about monetary policy decisions and its
economic outlook simultaneously in the QIR.7 Thus, we can consider the impact of uncertainty
and skewness shocks independent of information about the BOE’s policy decisions through the
second quarter of 2015 but not after. Figure 3.2 provides an overview of the BoE’s information
release schedule.
3.1.2 Density forecast data
Density forecast data for inflation from 2004 and for GDP growth from 2007 are publicly
available as part of the BoE’s quarterly inflation report.8 Density forecast data for inflation from
1997 through 2005 and for GDP growth from 1997 through 2007 are available through the U.K.’s
7The BoE began referring to this joint release as its Monetary Policy Report in November 2019.
8This data is available for download here: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/inflation-report/inflation-reports
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Figure 3.2: Policy and Communication Schedule
national archive.9. Density forecasts of inflation from 2004 and onward use the consumer price
index (CPI) to measure inflation while older inflation data uses retail purchases excluding mortgage
payments (RPIX) to measure inflation.
The BoE publishes two different density forecasts for both GDP growth and inflation, each
following a different assumption about the interest rate path. The bank forms one set of density
forecasts by assuming that the prevailing nominal interest rate will continue throughout the forecast
horizon. We call this the constant-rate assumption. The second set of density forecasts assumes
the nominal interest rate matches the market’s expected nominal rate throughout the forecast hori-
9This data is available for download here: https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20170831105150/
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/inflationreport/irprobab.aspx
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zon. We call this the market-rate assumption. The BoE formed projections under the constant-rate
assumption for 9 quarters, including a current-quarter forecast, from the beginning of our sam-
ple through May 2013 and for 13 quarters thereafter. The bank makes projections under market
assumptions, when available, out to 13 quarters.
These two alternative interest rate assumptions typically yield different values of µ (point fore-
cast) but have no impact on σ (uncertainty) or γ (skewness). Thus, we need not discern between
these two interest rate assumptions when considering how rates and expectations respond to higher-
order forecast moments.
We show the first moment of the BoE’s density forecasts of GDP growth and inflation formed



























































































































Figure 3.3: First moments of the BoE’s density forecasts of GDP growth and inflation
Note that movements in σ and γ are highly correlated over time across their respective forecast
horizons. Also worth noting is that σπ, σY , for all forecast horizons, both exhibit considerably
more variability before and through the early parts of the Great Recession than in subsequent
forecasts, suggesting that MPC may have changed its approach to parameter selection. This change
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seems to correspond to the peak of a drastic increase in uncertainty surrounding density forecasts



































































































































































































































































Figure 3.4: Uncertainty and skewness of GDP growth and inflation
Notice also that γπ rarely takes on positive values at any forecast horizon. This means the BoE
rarely expects downside risk to dominate across our time sample. Also interesting to note is that
γY doesn’t behave similarly across the two most recent recessions, which aligns with the idea that
the MPC has begun taking a much different approach to how it selects values of γ and σ when
forming its density forecasts. Finally, it is also noteworthy that neither of γπ nor γY appears to be
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strongly counter-cyclical, which is true of most other measures of economic uncertainty (Bloom,
2014).
3.1.3 Daily data for the UK’s yield curve
The BoE forms two different daily estimates of maturities along the UK’s yield curve. The first
estimate is for maturities ranging from one to 60 sixty months in one-month intervals. Following
the BoE’s nomenclature, we refer to this as the ’short-end’ estimate. The second estimate is for
maturities ranging from six months to 25 years in six-month intervals. The BoE has more recently
begun estimating maturities out to 40 years. However, we only consider yields out to 25 years
since these estimates are available for our entire time sample. We refer to this as the ’long-run’
estimates. Data for both estimates are publicly available through the BoE’s website.10
The BoE bases its daily estimates of maturities on UK government bonds (gilts) and yields
in the general collateral(GC) repurchase agreement (repo) market. The bank generates synthetic
zero-coupon bonds from GC repo rates to improve its estimates of shorter maturities, where gilts
tend to be less liquid. The BoE uses the variable roughness penalty (VRP) method, based on the
spline-based technique proposed by Waggoner (1997), to estimate the yield curve.
3.1.4 Data Transformations
Revisions
We obtain our main results using a high-frequency identification strategy. We project changes
in maturities across the UK’s yield curve that occur in a small window surrounding QIR releases
onto shocks to the first three central moments of the BoE’s density forecasts of GDP growth and
inflation. Thus, we transform our data to obtain two primary components: a left-hand-side variable
capturing these maturity changes and right-hand-side variables capturing shocks to our moments
of interest for inflation and GDP growth (i.e. information shocks).
To obtain our information shocks, we exploit the fact that the BoE often revises the value of our
parameters of interest used to forecast economic values for some fixed point in time in sequential
10This data is available for download at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/yield-curves
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Figure 3.5: Sequential forecast example
Table of Correlations for Revision Factors
Yµ Yσ2 Yξ πµ πσ2 πξ
Yµ 1.00
Yσ2 -.3170 1.00
Yξ .0088 .1773 1.00
πµ -.0038 -.1795 .1413 1.00
πσ2 -.0885 .1552 -.0399 .0727 1.00
πξ -.3030 .2649 .1937 .0311 -.0354 1.00
Prop. .6 .67 .86 .69 .66 .83
Table 3.1: Table of correlations for information shocks
forecasts. For example, consider the BoE’s forecasts of some key economic variable made in the
first and second quarters of 2010, which we depict in Section 3.1.4.
Given these two forecasts, we first compute the change in parameter values µ, σ, γ associated
with the BoE’s density forecasts of inflation and output growth for each possible forecast hori-
zon. Using values depicted in Section 3.1.4, we compute these revisions for the second quarter
of 2010 as ∆Z0 = Z0 − H1, ∆Z1, ∆Z2, ..., ∆Z7. Next, we use principle component analysis
(PCA) to extract the first principle component from ∆Z0, ∆Z1, ∆Z2, ..., ∆Z7 to obtain PCx,j,t
where x = {µ, σ2, ξ}, j = {π, Y }. This approach allows us to summarize the majority of the vari-
ation contained in our information shocks while abstracting away from certain horizon-specific
idiosyncrasies. We graph these information shocks for GDP growth and inflation in Figure 3.6.11
Section 3.1.4 gives the level of correlation between these factors.
We follow Diebold and Li (2006) to extract time-varying level, slope, and curvature factors
from our daily yield estimate that models the UK’s yield curve. Because we have daily data, we
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Figure 3.6: GDP growth and inflation revision factors
obtain daily estimates of these factors and can use the change in these estimated factors that occurs
on inflation report release dates as outcome variables in the high-frequency identification scheme
described above. To extract these factors, we use all available yield curve data ranging from the
last quarter of 1997 through the second quarter of 2015. For maturities ranging from one to 60
months, we use data from the BoE’s short-end yield curve estimates. These estimates are available
for available for maturities at monthly intervals. For maturities further into the term structure, we
use the BoE’s estimates of the full yield curve. These estimates are available for maturities ranging
from six months to 25 years in six-month intervals. Using this data, we estimate Equation (3.2)













Interpretations of each βi,t that follows directly from the behavior of the corresponding loadings































(a) Factor Loadings (b) Factors
Figure 3.7: Yield curve factor loadings.
The loading on β1,t, X1, is a constant so that we can interpret β1,t as our long-term (i.e. level)
factor. X2,m decays monotonically from one to zero and so we can interpret β2,t as our short-
term (i.e. slope) factor. X3,m begins at zero, peaks at around 30 months, and then converges
monotonically toward zero. Thus, we treat 3,t as the medium-term (i.e. curvature) factor.
3.2 Results
This section presents our main results, wherein we use a high-frequency identification ap-
proach, developed by Cook and Hahn (1989), Kuttner (2001), and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2002).
For examples of this identification approach, see Nakamura and Steinsson (2018) or Gurkanayak,
Sack, and Swanson (2004).
In our context, this identification scheme involves projecting changes in yield curve factors
that occur in the 24-hour window surrounding QIR releases onto our information. Our identifying
assumption is that variation in our outcomes of interest that occur in our tight window surrounding
67
the release of the inflation report is driven by the information shocks we extract from sequential
QIR releases.
Using ∆βi,t and ∆PCx,j,t, where i = {l, c, s} we estimate:
∆βi,t = αi,t +
∑
x,j
ψx,jPCx,j,t + κi,tFTSEt−1 + εi,t (3.3)
which we estimate using a Newey-West estimator. Here, ψx,j captures the causal relationship
between our information shocks and yield maturities, and FTSEt−1 is a daily, market-based mea-
sure of economic uncertainty. Note that we standardize both the revision factors and the yield
curve factors. This is helpful for two reasons. First, for a given yield curve factor, we can compare
the magnitude of estimated effects for each of our six revision factors. Second, for a given revision
factor, we can make relative comparisons of its effect on the three different yield curve factors.12
We graph ψx,j for each yield factor estimated using our full data sample, during expansions,
and during contractions in Figure 3.8.13 Graphs in the left column show estimates of how the
U.K.’s yield curve responds to revisions of the BoE’s GDP growth forecast. Graphs in the right
column do the same for inflation. Within each panel, there are three clusters of three coefficients
each surrounded by confidence intervals that fade from 60% (darkest) and to 90% (lightest). Each
cluster of coefficients corresponds to either the mean, uncertainty, or skewness revision factor.
Within each cluster, we provide estimates from a model that uses revisions of the level, slope, or
curvature factor as the dependent variable.
Estimates of Equation (3.3) using our full data indicate that revisions to the higher-order mo-
ments of both GDP growth and inflation matter at least as much as revisions of the respective
first-order moments. We see that an increase in inflation forecast uncertainty puts upward (down-
ward) pressure on long-term (short-term) maturities and that medium-term yields exhibit a nega-
tive response to an increase in outlook on the balance of risks. Also, we see that an increase in the
MPC’s outlook on the balance of risks for GDP growth can put upward (downward) pressure on
12We also show the response of individual yields across the U.k.’s yield curve to information shocks in our appendix.

















































































































































































































Figure 3.8: Yield responses to information shocks
short- and medium-term (long-term) rates. This suggests that information contained in the third-
moment of MPC’s predictive density of GDP growth might contribute to yield curve inversion,
which is commonly interpreted as a sign of an impending recession.
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We gain additional insight by considering the state-contingent effects of information shocks.
To do this, we extract the cyclical component of U.K. GDP using the Hamilton filter (Hamilton,
2018) and partition our data into expansionary and contractionary periods whenever the cyclical
component of GDP is positive or negative, respectively. We can then consider separately the effects
of equivalent information shocks during expansions and contractions. We graph the results of this
exercise in panels (c) thru (f) of Figure 3.8.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 3.8 depict the results of estimating Equation (3.3) over expansion-
ary periods. For GDP growth, the response of yield factors to first-moment revisions is reversed
relative to full-sample estimates. Further, we see that yields exhibit a muted response to skewness
shocks during expansions relative to full-sample estimates.
We also find qualitative differences in how yields respond to information shocks surrounding
inflation during expansions relative to full-sample estimates. The response of long- and short-
term yields to skewness shocks is exacerbated while the response of the yield curve to uncertainty
shocks is muted.
First-order moments of the MPC’s output growth forecast are much more important during
contractions than during expansions, with positive shock putting significant upward (downward)
pressure on short-term (long-term) yields. Further, we now see that shocks to both higher-order
moments of the GDP growth forecast put upward pressure on short- and medium-term yields, and
downward pressure on long-term yields.
Finally, we consider how yields respond to inflation information shocks during a contraction.
Most interesting to note is that the yield curve exhibits a qualitatively different response to inflation
skewness shocks during contractions relative to expansions.
We ensure the validity of our results by performing a placebo check wherein we re-estimate
Equation (3.3) using changes to yield curve factors that occur on days when the BoE did not
release a QIR. If our main results reflect a true causal relationship between financial markets and
information contained in the higher-order moments of the BoE’s forecast, we would expect that
our placebo estimates to be relatively precise zeros, with some tolerance for type one errors. We
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R2 Full Contraction Expansion
Level 0.21 0.43 0.31
Curvature 0.26 0.47 0.09
Slope 0.22 0.45 0.29
show the results of this placebo test in Figure 3.9.14 Because we estimate 56 coefficients in this
placebo exercise, we could reasonably expect approximately 5 or 6 significant coefficients in this
graph. We see fewer than this, which we interpret as some evidence that our main results are not
driven by spurious correlation.
We also consider how well our information shocks explain changes in short-, medium-, and
long-term yields over our full sample, during contractions, and during expansions. To do this,
we compare the coefficient of determination obtained from estimating Equation (3.3) over each
possible data sample. We report these results in Section 3.2. Overall, the information shocks better
explain yield curve movements during contractions than expansions.
3.2.1 Expectations
This section of the results deals with the relationship between higher-order moments of central
bank forecasts and private expectations. Much empirical and experimental work supports the idea
that central banks can use point forecasts to coordinate expectations and nudge boundedly-rational
agents toward ex-ante rationality, thereby reducing economic volatility. However, there is very
limited evidence regarding how higher-order moments influence expectation formation, if at all.
We provide some suggestive evidence that professional forecasters do respond to higher-order
forecast moments.
To do this, we estimate Equation (3.4) using as our outcome variables the three-, six-, and
12-month-ahead consensus forecast and forecast disagreement15 for the three-month Sterling rate
and the 10-year Guilt rate, avialable at a monthly frequency from Blue Chip Financial Forecast
14We provide corresponding numerical coefficient estimates in tabular form in our appendix.
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Figure 3.9: Placebo estimates
(BCFF). The BCFF is a monthly survey administered at the beginning of each month. Because the
BCFF is administered early in each month, survey respondents have already provided responses
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Figure 3.10: Response of professional forecasters to information shocks
temporaneously to information contained in the QIR. We account for this by projecting each of
our three forecast outcomes onto lagged values of our information shocks. For example, the BoE
releases its first-quarter inflation report about halfway through February each year. To understand
how private expectations respond to information in this report, we project our variables of interest
from the BCFF survey collected in March onto information shocks extracted from the February
report. We graph these results in Figure 3.10.
∆Measurei,t = αi,t +
∑
x,j
ψx,jPCx,j,t−1 + κi,tFTSEt−1 + εi,t (3.4)
We first consider the relationship between short-term interest rate forecasts and our information
shocks. Note that consensus forecasts at all horizons are at least as strongly correlated to forecast
uncertainty as they are to first-moment revisions. This correlation is particularly strong for inflation
uncertainty, which corresponds to our full-sample estimate of how short-term maturities respond
to inflation uncertainty shocks. This logical coherence between expectations and yield movements
also holds for GDP growth uncertainty, where both expectations and actual maturities exhibit a
small, positive response to output growth uncertainty shocks. However, private expectations of
short-term rates are seemingly uncorrelated with the third-moment of either predictive density.
Additionally, we see that inflation uncertainty and forecast disagreement are negatively corre-
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lated but GDP growth uncertainty and disagreement are positively correlated. This suggests market
participants in the UK may better understand how the MPC, which officially follows an inflation-
targeting regime, will respond to inflation uncertainty than to output growth uncertainty. Finally,
we also see that expectations of short-term rates are negatively correlated with the third-moment
of the MPC’s forecast of GDP growth but are seemingly uncorrelated with the third-moment of
the inflation forecast. This suggests that market participants better understand how the MPC will
respond to upside inflation risk than to upside output risk.
Second, we consider the relationship between long-term interest rate forecasts and information
shocks. Similar to short-term rates, we see that private expectations are at least as strongly corre-
lated with higher-order information as they are with information about the central moment of both
inflation and GDP growth density forecasts. We also see the same logical coherence between how
expectations and maturities respond to information shocks.
Overall, the coherence we observe between how private expectations and maturities respond to
second-order information shocks suggests that market participants better understand how maturi-
ties respond to uncertainty than to information surrounding risk.
3.2.2 Historical Decomposition
This section considers the historical importance of higher-order information for explaining
yield curve changes by decomposing changes in level, slope, and curvature factors over time. We
plot these historical decompositions in Figure 3.11.
This decomposition exercise shows that our results are not driven by anomalous events (i.e. the
Great Recession). Rather, we see that higher-order information shocks have played a consistently-
important role in explaining yield curve movements. Further, we see that higher-order informa-














































































































Figure 3.11: Historical decomposition of yield curve factor revisions
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3.3 Conclusion
This paper considers the BoE’s density forecasts and its revisions to quantify the effects of
information flow on the financial markets and expectations. The paper contributes to the broader
literature on the effects of news on financial markets and to the emerging literature on how infor-
mation in the higher-order moments of central bank forecasts matters from a policy perspective.
We find that financial markets respond at least as strongly to the information contained in
the higher-order moments of the BoE’s density forecasts of output growth and inflation as to the
information contained in the corresponding first moments. further, we find that both the magnitude
and direction of responses are state-contingent.
Additionally, we use Blue Chip Financial Forecast data to study how professional forecasters
respond to information contained in higher-order forecast moments. We find that the consensus
forecast and level of forecast disagreement of both short- and long-term interest rates are strongly
correlated with higher-order forecast moments. Further, we observe a logical coherence between
private expectations and realized yield changes, suggesting that market participants understand
how rates will respond to higher-order forecast moments.
Overall, our results suggest that communicating high-order forecasts moments to market par-
ticipants does affect their subsequent behavior. Important from a policy perspective is that higher-
order moments can move markets, which suggests that density forecasting is a viable policy option.
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Central banks have become increasingly transparent over the last few decades, with most banks
now disclosing information surrounding operations, procedures, economic outlook and policy.
This transparency revolution is driven largely by a deeper understanding of the importance of
expectations, central bank credibility, and of the ability of communication to function as a policy
tool.
A prominent feature of transparency is the publication of macroeconomic projections. As ar-
gued by Greenspan (2004), forming and communicating macroeconomic projections plays as an
important role in the preemptive response of policy makers to inflationary pressures. Such forecasts
not only play an important internal role in policy deliberations, but also provide market participants
with insight into how the central bank thinks the economy and policy rate may evolve. Projec-
tions align private-sector expectations and improve forecast accuracy in theory (Geraats (2002),
Woodford (2005), Rudebusch and Williams (2008), Gosselin et al. (2008), Blinder et al. (2008)),
experiments (Kryvtsov and Petersen, 2015, 2020, Mokhtarzadeh and Petersen 2018, Ahrens et al.
2019), and in practice (Brubakk et. al. (2017), Hubert (2014, 2015), Blinder et al. (2008), and
Kool and Thornton (2015)).
However, central banks are communicating in an uncertain world. Not only are the timing and
magnitude of the effects of monetary policy uncertain, but so are the shocks the economy faces.
Consequently, many central banks publish density forecasts, rather than just point projections, in
an effort to convey a subjective measure of uncertainty about economic outlook and the future path
1*Reprinted with permission from “Should central banks communicate uncertainty in their projections?” by
Rholes, Ryan and Petersen, Luba, 2021. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Volume 183, Pages 320-341,
Copyright [2021] by Elsevier.
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of policy and to preserve credibility. Density forecasts typically convey the same information con-
tained in point forecasts, but also present the central bank’s uncertainty surrounding its projections
(second moment) and the bank’s outlook on risk (third moment). The Bank of England was the
first to publish ’fan charts’ of its macroeconomic projections in 1998, with the Federal Reserve,
the European Central Bank, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Canada, and the Swedish
Riksbank following suit.
Despite the growing trend of central banks communicating uncertainty by publishing density
forecasts, there exists almost no empirical or theoretical evidence that this improves the ability of
central bank projections to influence markets, or coordinate and improve private forecasts. One
exception is Rholes and Sekhposyan (2020) who show that short-term yields respond at least as
strongly to revisions of the second- and third-moments of the BoE’s density forecasts as they do
to revisions of the first-moment of the same density forecasts.2 In closely related experimental
work, Mokhtarzadeh and Petersen (2018) show that density projections (that present both the point
forecast and a confidence interval) are effective at managing expectations if they are relevant and
easy to understand. Their findings, however, do not isolate the effect of density forecasts from the
point projections.
This paper provides original empirical evidence on the effects of point and density forecasts
on the management and formation of inflation expectations. We systematically vary inflation pro-
jection announcements communicated by the economy’s automated central bank within a macroe-
conomic learning-to-forecast laboratory experiment where groups of participants simultaneously
form inflation expectations. We incentivize participants to form accurate one- and two-period-
ahead inflation expectations. Aggregated expectations endogenously influence macroeconomic
dynamics. Given participants’ potentially bounded rationality, there is a role for central bank com-
munication to guide expectations. We also elicit participants’ confidence about their forecasts,
allowing us to clearly identify the transmission of central bank uncertainty to forecasters.
We consider three levels of central bank communication in a between-subject design: No sup-
2Uncertainty about monetary policy can have negative economic effects. See Neely (2005), Swanson (2006), Bauer
(2012), Husted, Rogers, and Sun (2018, 2019) for discussion.
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plementary communication, five-period ahead point projections, and five-period ahead point and
density projections. Both projections are based on the assumption that agents form ex-ante ratio-
nal expectations. Density projections are symmetric one-standard deviation confidence intervals
around the point projection. This variation allows us to disentangle the effects of communicated
uncertainty on expectation formation.
Relative to a baseline of no communication, we find that point projections reduce disagree-
ment and uncertainty about future inflation, and medium term (two-period-ahead) forecast errors.
Moreover, point projections increase the proportion of inexperienced participants who forecast
one-period-ahead inflation as if they were ex-ante rational by 72 percentage points for a total of
86% of participants.
Density projections mute the beneficial effects of point projections. Compared to point pro-
jections, communicating density forecasts significantly increase forecast errors, uncertainty, and
disagreement about two-period-ahead inflation. Credibility in the central bank’s point projection
is significantly lower when it includes a density forecast. Only 57% of inexperienced participants
in density treatments form rational one-period-ahead expectations.
It is also important to understand why projections have proven effective at managing real-word
expectations. Is it because economic agents use publicly communicated projections purely as a
coordination device or do the projections provide valuable information that forecasters and market
participants use to improve forecast accuracy? To answer this question, we conduct the same com-
munication treatments in an individual-choice environment absent any strategic considerations. In
both Individual and Group treatments, the projection provides information and, more importantly,
reduces the complexity of the forecasting problem. In the Group treatments, there is an additional
strategic consideration. Group participants should use the projection if and only if they believe the
majority of participants will.
Thus, our individual-choice treatments have participants play the role of the representative
forecaster, with their own expectations employed as the aggregate expectation driving macroeco-
nomic dynamics. Our motivation for this treatment is to investigate whether people choose to use
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projections because of their information content or as a coordination device. Thus, our individual-
forecaster treatment eliminates any coordination motives. Though this individual setting lacks
some degree of external validity, it allows us to tease apart and understand the motives underlying
central bank projections. We expose participants in our individual-choice treatments to the same
three levels of central bank communication used in our group setting. This allows us to draw infer-
ence about the effect of strategic motives on how subjects use central bank forecasts when forming
expectations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first learning-to-forecast experiment to
compare individual vs. group forecasting behaviour.
Absent strategic motives, participants are significantly more heterogeneous in their forecasts
and form larger forecast errors. Individual forecasters also anticipate making larger forecast er-
rors when they have no supplementary communication from the central bank, suggesting that the
wisdom of the group improves confidence. Point projections reduce individuals’ two-period-ahead
forecast errors, though not as effectively as in group settings. Neither point projections nor density
projections consistently reduce disagreement or uncertainty in Individual treatments. Our findings
suggests that the information content associated with projections is not as valuable as their ability
to serve as a coordination device.
Finally, our experimental results provide useful guidance for the modeling of inflation expec-
tations. First, we find ample evidence to suggest that a large majority of participants will adopt
an as-if rational heuristic when they observe a rationally-constructed inflation point projection.
Second, most participants use the same heuristics to formulate both their short and medium term
expectations.
4.2 Experimental Design
Our experiment seeks to understand how central bank point and density projections influence
expectations and aggregate dynamics. To this end, we study a ’learning-to-forecast (LTF)’ exper-
imental macroeconomy that uses either the aggregate expectations of groups or the expectations
of individuals, depending on the treatment, to influence aggregate variables. Such experimental
economies are well-studied. Macroeconomists have used similar experiments to study expectation
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formation and equilibria selection (Adam, 2007), the effects of different monetary policy rules and
targets on expectation formation (Pfajfar and Žakelj 2014, 2018; Assenza et al. 2013, Hommes et
al. 2019a; Cornand and M’Baye, 2018a), expectation formation at the zero lower bound (Arifovic
and Petersen 2017, Hommes et al. 2019b), and the endogenous dynamics of expectations and
real decisions (Bao et al., 2013). Learning-to-forecast experiments have been shown to reasonably
match inflation forecasting patterns observed in surveys of households, firms, and professional
forecasters (Cornand and Hubert, 2019).
We are also interested in understanding how subjects’ own uncertainty about future inflation
responds to both precise and noisy central bank projections. Pfajfar and Žakelj (2016) also explore
uncertainty in response to different inflation targeting regimes. Similarly, our paper is closely
related to Cornand and M’baye (2018b), in which the authors use an LTF framework to explore
the relative merits of point and band inflation targeting. The authors find that during periods of low
uncertainty, band targeting better stabilizes inflation. Also, point targeting with tolerance bands
leads to a lower and less volatile output gap and interest rate. The authors also find that both
regimes are equally ineffective at stabilizing macroeconomic dynamics during periods of high
uncertainty. Our paper differs from theirs in that, rather than varying the central bank’s targeting
regime, we use a single point inflation target and vary the central bank’s communication strategy.
We begin by describing the design of our baseline environment, which involves groups of seven
participants playing the roles of forecasters in an environment with no supplementary central bank
communication. In Section 4.2.3, we describe how the environment changes as we allow for
individually-driven economies and central bank projections.
We summarize the flow of information, decisions, and outcomes throughout the experiment in
Figure 4.1. Each experiment consists of two different sequences of 30 sequentially linked periods.
In each period t ∈ [1, 30], participants submit forecasts about t + 1 and t + 2 inflation, as well as
predictions about the magnitude of their forecast errors.
At the beginning of each period, subjects observe all historical information about inflation, the
nominal interest rate, and demand shocks. Importantly, subjects can also observe the value of the
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current-period demand shock.3 Subjects also observe their own history of one- and two-period-
ahead inflation forecasts and total earnings.
Figure 4.1: Flow of information, decisions, and outcomes
Subjects had 65 seconds to form forecasts in periods 1-9 of each sequence and 50 seconds
thereafter. Inflation expectations and corresponding uncertainty forecasts were submitted in basis
points. Inflation forecasts could be positive, negative, or zero. Uncertainty measures could be
either zero or positive. All submissions were unbounded. Since we collect forecast in terms of
basis points, subjects could submit forecasts with a precision of 1
100
th of 1%.
After all subjects submitted expectations or time elapsed, participants moved onto the next
period. The economy’s data-generating process, which will be described in the next subsection,
relies on aggregate one- and two-period-ahead inflation expectations. We use the median forecasts,
rather than the average, as the aggregate expectations to curtail the impact that any one subject can
have on our experimental economies. This has the effect of making it as though forecasters are
atomistic.
3Subjects have sufficient information to calculate the expected value of future shocks and can incorporate this, if
they desire, into current-period forecasts.
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4.2.1 Data-generating process
Each treatment shares a common data-generating process, which is derived from a log-linearized,
representative-agent New Keynesian (NK) framework We re-write this model to eliminate the need
for expectations about the one-period-ahead output gap. This manipulation of the NK model al-
lows us to use a system of equations driven by one- and two-period-ahead inflation expectations
and aggregate disturbances. Thus, we need only elicit Et{πt+1},Et{πt+2} from our subjects. See
the Online Appendix Section B for details about the differences in stability and forecast errors in
the two formalizations.
We begin with a standard 4-equation, reduced-form NK model
πt = βEt{πt+1}+ κxt (4.1)
it = φππt + φxxt (4.2)
xt = Et{xt+1} − σ−1[it − Et{πt+1} − rnt ]. (4.3)
We eliminate the need to elicit Et{xt+1} by rewriting (3), iterating forward, taking expectations,
applying the law of iterated expectations, and substituting to obtain:
xt = (κ
−1 + σ−1)Et{πt+1} − βκ−1Et{πt+2} − σ−1it + σ−1rnt . (4.4)
Substitutions yield a representation of (3) that depends only on inflation expectations,
πt = [β + κγ1γ2]Et{πt+1} − γ1βEt{πt+2}+ κγ1σ−1rnt , (4.5)
where we use the following variable substitutions
γ1 =
(





−1 + σ−1 − σ−1φπβ). (4.7)
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This yields a dynamical system that can be solved using Et{πt+1},Et{πt+2}, rnt . Here, rnt
represents a demand shock that evolves following an AR(1) process,
rnt = ρrrt−1 + εr,t (4.8)
where εr,t is i.i.d. ∼ N (0, σr) and ρr is a persistence parameter. The data-generating process
is calibrated to match moments of Canadian data following Kryvtsov and Petersen (2015); σ = 1,
β = 0.989, κ = 0.13, φπ = 1.5, φx = 0.5, ρr = 0.57, and σr = 113 bps, with a steady state of
π∗ = x∗ = 0
Given these parameters, the system of equations reduces to
πt = 1.54Et{πt+1} − 0.58Et{πt+2}+ 0.08rnt (4.9)
it = 4.44Et{πt+1} − 3.12Et{πt+2}+ 0.41rnt . (4.10)
We use aggregate expectations provided by participants to close the model. Aside from Adam
(2007), this is the only experiment within a NK framework that elicits expectations for two future
time periods. However, this particular formulation of the NK model is novel to the learning-
to-forecast literature. This formulation accomplishes two things. First, it reduces the cognitive
complexity subjects face by allowing them to focus on forecasting a single time series. Second, it
allows us to understand how these information conditions affect expectations further into the future
than would be possible otherwise.
Worth noting here is the counter-balancing effect of expectations on this system. Equation (4.9)
and Equation (4.10) retain the familiar feature that one-period-ahead expectations are self-fulfilling,
but we also observe, counter-intuitively, that two-period-ahead expectations are not self-fulfilling.
However, this counter-balancing of expectations makes sense from the perspective of consump-
tion smoothing. Expecting higher prices tomorrow encourages an agent to consume more today
to avoid the higher prices tomorrow. This behavior puts upward pressure on prices today, lead-
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ing to higher inflation today. If an agent also expects inflation two days from now, then they will
want to have more money to spend tomorrow than otherwise, so that an agent can similarly avoid
paying higher prices two days from now. As we show in the Online Appendix, this particular pre-
sentation of the DGP does not alter the qualitative benefits of rationally–constructed central bank
projections.
4.2.2 Payoffs
We incentivized forecasts using the scoring rule described by Equation (4.11). Notice that Fit
exhibits exponential decay as that forecaster i′s absolute forecasting error increases.
Fit = 2
−.5|Ei,t−1{πt}−πt|+2−.5|Ei,t−2{πt}−πt| (4.11)
Subjects received payoffs for all forecasts about t+ 1 formed in t ∈ [1, 29] and t+ 2 forecasts
formed in t ∈ [1, 28]. Subjects in our experiment also provided measures of uncertainty about
their one- and two-period-ahead inflation forecasts, which we denote here as ui,t+1, ui,t+2 ∈ N0.
This measure of uncertainty creates a subject-level density forecast in each period for both forecast
horizons. We assume a subject’s forecast uncertainty is symmetric around her point forecasts,
which is similar to our assumption about the central bank’s forecast uncertainty. We incentive this
uncertainty measure using a piece-wise scoring rule.4 A subject earns nothing if actual inflation
fall outside her density forecast (i.e., her uncertainty bands). Otherwise, a subject earns Ui,t+k,





The payoff that participants receive for their error forecast decreases in the level of their fore-
casted error. Because we incentivize uncertainty measures for each forecast horizon, a subject
4A concern here is that this scoring rule may only be incentive-compatible with risk-neutral agents. A risk-
loving agent may slightly under-report her uncertainty while a risk-averse agent may slightly over-report uncertainty.
However, we can distinguish neither risk-loving behavior from overconfidence nor risk-averse behavior from under-
confidence.
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could earn a total of three points in each period for her uncertainty measures. This scoring rule
is similar to the rule used in Pfajfar and Žakelj (2016), which studied the effect of various mon-
etary policy rules on individual uncertainty.5 To address the possibility of hedging, we randomly
selected at the session level in each period whether to pay F or Ut+1 + Ut+2. However, we never
paid both in the same period.
4.2.3 Treatments
We used a 3x2 between-subject experimental design to study the effects of central bank com-
munication and strategic motives on expectation formation and aggregate dynamics. Table 4.1
summarizes the treatments.
Subjects formed forecasts under one of three information conditions: a baseline where a mech-
anistic central bank provided no projections (NoComm), a projection-only treatment where the
central bank provided an evolving five-period-ahead point forecast of inflation (Point), and a den-
sity forecast treatment where the central bank provided both an evolving five-period-ahead point
forecast point and density forecast of inflation (Point&Density).
We also varied the environment along a coordination dimension. Subjects either participated
in a Group treatment, where they interacted in an experimental economy with six other subjects,
or an Individual treatment, where each subject served as the sole forecaster in her experimental
economy. In other words, subjects in Individual treatments played an individual choice game;
their expectations alone, coupled with the demand shock, drove the dynamics of their economies.
Subjects in Individual treatments understood that they each inhabited a unique economy.
Participants interacted in an online platform. See ?? for an example of the NoComm interface,
?? for the Point interface, and ?? for the Point&Density interface. Subjects in all treatments
always interacted with the same screen in each decision period. The screen updated to display
new information as that information became available.
Aside from the communications from the central bank, all participants received common in-
formation. The top left corner of a subject’s screen showed the subject’s identification number, the
5Pfajfar and Žakelj (2016) elicit participants’ own 95% confidence intervals around their point forecasts.
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Table 4.1: Treatments summary
Group
CB Projection Sequences Total Subjects Periods Aggregate Expectations
NoComm 6 42 30 x 2 median of group
Point 6 42 30 x 2 median of group
PointDensity 6 42 30 x 2 median of group
Individual
CB Projection Sequences Total Subjects Periods Aggregate Expectations
NoComm 6 39 30 x 2 own
Point 6 42 30 x 2 own
Point&Density 6 38 30 x 2 own
current decision period, time remaining to make a decision, and the total number of points earned
through the end of the previous period. The interface also featured three history plots. The top
history panel displayed past interest rates, and both past and current shocks. The second panel
displayed the subject’s one-period-ahead inflation forecast (blue dots), the subject’s uncertainty
surrounding this one-period-ahead forecast (blue shading), and all realized values of inflation (red
dots). The third history panel displayed the subject’s two-period-ahead inflation forecast (orange
dots), the subject’s uncertainty surrounding this two-period-ahead forecast (orange shading), and
all realized values of inflation (red dots).
Treatment variation appeared in the second and third history panels. Notice in ?? (NoComm)
that the central bank provided neither point nor density forecasts. In ?? (Point) the second and third
history plots displayed the central bank’s evolving, five-period-ahead point forecast (green dots).
Finally, the second and third history plots in ?? (Point&Density) contained the central bank’s
evolving five-period-ahead point forecast (green dots) with its corresponding level of uncertainty
(green shading).
We explained to subjects in both Point and Point&Density treatments that the central bank’s
projections were not a guarantee, thus indicating that there is some level of uncertainty surrounding
the central bank’s projections. We also explained to subjects that the central bank’s forecasts are
based on the DGP and all available information to emphasize the potential errors in the central
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bank’s projection model.
We further indicate in Point&Density treatments that the density forecast represents the central
bank’s own uncertainty about its point projections. Our exact phrasing was: "These forecasts also
include green shading, which represents the Central Bank’s level of uncertainty for its correspond-
ing point projections. These bands will contain the correct realization of inflation about 66% of
the time."
The level of fundamental uncertainty is always the same because it is driven by the shock
process, which is quantitatively conveyed to participants in the instructions. The density treatment
does not provide any new information in this regard. It only changes the salience of the uncertainty
in the environment.
The mechanistic central bank in our experiment always used a symmetric density forecast.
However, this is not always true of density forecasts provided by real-world central banks. An
interesting extension to this project would be studying how forecasters react to asymmetric den-
sity forecasts. This is akin to studying how forecasters incorporate information contained in the
skewness (third central moment) of a central bank density forecasts, which we can think of intu-
itively as a bank’s outlook on economic risks. Finally, we note that the mechanistic central bank
assumed that the aggregate expectation in each experimental economy was ex-ante rational. The
central bank’s density forecast was simply a one standard-deviation band centered around its point
forecast.6
We conducted six independent sessions of each of the six treatments for a total of 36 experi-
mental sessions. Each session consisted of two, 30-period repetitions (decision blocks). For a given
session, we randomly drew a shock sequence for two repetitions from our theoretical distribution
of shocks. Within a treatment, we drew six different shock sequences (or 12 if you count each
repetition). We then used the same shock sequences across treatments for comparability. Usage of
different shock sequences allows for a more robust analysis of expectation formation.
6Mokhtarzadeh and Petersen (2020) show experimentally that both the assumptions underlying central bank pro-
jections and the information communicated alongside projects matter for expectations formations and aggregate sta-
bility. Thus, it seems reasonable that additional information about perceived risk could change how agents incorporate
information contained in other forecast moments.
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Finally, we initialized each experimental economy at the zero–inflation steady state. We showed
subjects five preceding periods of the economy operating along this steady state before introduc-
ing a demand shock in period one. Note that it would not be rational, given that shocks evolve
according to an autoregressive process, to forecast zero inflation for periods two or three.
4.2.4 Procedures
The experiments were conducted at Simon Fraser University from October 2019 to January
2020. We began each session by reading aloud from paper instructions that included detailed
information about subjects’ forecasting task, the uncertainty measurement task, how we incentivize
forecasts and uncertainty, and how the experimental economy evolved in response to expectations
and aggregate shocks. Participants knew they could use the computer’s calculator or spreadsheets
if desired.
Following the instructions, subjects played four unpaid practice periods during which they
could ask questions. Following the practice periods, subjects played through the two incentivized
sequences. Each sequence employed a different variation of the shock sequence so that subjects did
not repeat an identical game in the second block of decisions. We paid subjects in cash immediately
following each experimental session. Payoffs, including a CDN$7 show–up fee, ranged from
CDN$12-25, and were on average CDN$21.
4.2.5 Hypotheses
Our experimental design allows us to test several hypotheses regarding differences in how point
and density forecasts impact aggregate dynamics and individual behavior. Further, we are able to
test hypotheses regarding how subjects use information differently when they face the strategic
considerations present in a coordination setting.
If all subjects in our experiment are model–consistent and have full information about the
data–generating process (as they do), then we should observe that neither projection (Point or
Point&Density) changes aggregate dynamics or individual behavior relative to one another or the
NoComm setting. The projections would be irrelevant because they would neither increase the
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information set of agents (as the mechanistic central bank does not have more information than
our subjects) nor impact how agents use available information. Further, model-consistent subjects
would behave equivalently when forming expectations in both individual-choice and coordination
settings since they possess the same information.
However, ample laboratory and survey evidence demonstrate that individuals, rather than con-
forming to rational expectations, form expectations in a backward-looking manner (See Assenza
et al., 2013; Pfajfar and Santoro, 2010; Pfajfar and Žakelj 2014; Coibion and ˘Gorodnichenko,
2015; Malmandier and Nagel, 2016). In a closely related experiment, Mokhtarzadeh and Petersen
(2020) show that, in the absence of central bank forecasts, most subjects follow either a Constant
Gain Learning model or an Adaptive(1) heuristic, whereby they equally weight historical infor-
mation and the ex-ante rational forecast when forming expectations. Backward-looking heuristics
also explain behavior in Pfajfar and Žakelj (2016), Cornand and M’Baye (2018b), and Hommes et
al. (2019).
Further, extensive empirical and experimental evidence supports the notion that central bank
forecasts have effectively coordinated private-sector expectations and stabilized markets (Hubert
2014, 2015, Jain and Sutherland, 2018, Mokhtarzadeh and Petersen, 2018, Ahrens et al. 2018,
Kryvtsov and Petersen, 2020).
Figure 4.2 presents simulated standard deviations of inflation and mean absolute forecast er-
rors under various forecasting heuristics and parameterizations. See Table 4.7 for the underlying
models and the Online Appendix Section B for a comparison of statistics under the one-period and
two-period ahead version of the linearized New Keynesian model under alternative heuristics.
Simulations show that inflation variability and forecast errors are strongly positively correlated.
Variability and errors are high when the representative agent adopts simple heuristics such as trend-
chasing, Adaptive(1), naive, and constant gain learning. Under all these heuristics, the agent uses
a misspecified model that relies on historical data, which introduces persistence into the economy.
Further, these heuristics yield relatively unstable dynamics because ad-hoc monetary policy is
93
Figure 4.2: Simulated statistics under alternative forecasting heuristics
unable to compensate for the agent’s non-rational expectations.7 We expect simple heuristics such
as naive, trend-chasing, and constant gain learning models to dominate given past experimental
findings in similar experiments (Cornand and M’Baye, 2018a; Pfajfar and Zakelj, 2014 and 2016;
Petersen and Rholes, 2020).
While forecasting the inflation target for one- and two-period-ahead inflation would produce
the lowest volatility and the smallest forecast errors of any of the non-rational alternatives we
consider, we believe it is unlikely that subjects will adopt this heuristic. This is because participants
have full information about the economy’s data-generating process and know that monetary policy
is unable to perfectly offset the exogenous demand shocks.
Heuristics that employ some degree of rational expectations (e.g. Adaptive(1) and ex-ante
rational) are considerably more sophisticated and unlikely to be used by most subjects. However,
both inflation variability and forecast errors are substantially lower if agents form ex-ante rational
expectations. Thus, there is value in easy-to-understand central bank communication that can guide
boundedly-rational agents to forecast rationally.
To illustrate how projections can manage expectations and uncertainty, we consider the beliefs
of a Bayesian-updating agent. We suppose there is some true state of the world πt+s and that both
our economic agent i and our central bank form beliefs about πt+s equal to the state of the world
7Note that under optimal monetary policy, the central bank would be able to offset the demand shock and perfectly
stabilize inflation given the agent’s expectations.
94
plus some error,














Bi is the ex-ante expectation of agent i about πt+s given complete knowledge about the econ-
omy’s data-generating process, historical economic information, and the realized shock in period
t. BCB is the central bank’s inflation point projection based on an identical information set. Pa-
rameters ψ and ω denote the precision (or the reciprocal of the variance) of the distributions of δ
and ν, respectively.
Agent i updates her prior of πt+s with the central bank’s communicated projection. Her poste-
rior expectation is a linear combination of her private belief and the central bank’s public belief,




This Bayseian updating exercise reveals that increasing the precision of the central bank’s in-
flation projection, ω, leads an agent to more heavily weight that projection when forming expec-
tations. This implies that we should see more ex-ante rational forecasters in the Point treatment
where the central bank’s ex-ante rational projections are more precise than in the Point+Density
treatment. We show in Figure 4.2 using simulations that shifting boundedly-rational subjects to-
ward ex-ante rationality will always reduce forecaster errors and, for all but inflation targeters,
reduce price volatility. Thus, we hypothesise that surrounding point forecasts with uncertainty will
lead to larger forecast errors and more price volatility.
Less sophisticated agents may not fully internalize the uncertainty present in the environment.
If so, then communicating uncertainty alongside the central bank’s point projection can make the
uncertainty salient. Depending on how the central bank communicates its projection, it may influ-
ence the perceived value of ω to boundedly-rational agents. For such agents, density projections
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make salient the model uncertainty surrounding the central bank’s point forecast, while point-only
projections may obscure the degree of uncertainty in the central bank’s outlook.
This framework yields insight into how central bank communicated uncertainty influences pri-
vate agents’ uncertainty, measured as the conditional variance of agent i’s forecast of πt+s,







Agent i’s conditional variance about πt+s is decreasing in her perception of the precision of the
central bank’s forecast. Thus, for a boundedly-rational agent who conflates the absence of com-
municated uncertainty with the absence of uncertainty surrounding the central bank’s projection,
providing a density forecast alongside a point forecast ought to increase individual–level uncer-
tainty.
We also predict that central bank projections will influence the level of disagreement across
forecasters. With NoComm, participants have various pieces of information at their disposal to
formulate their forecasts: the DGP, historical information, and the current shock. There is no ob-
vious focal point for coordination. By contrast, both Point and Point&Density projections provide
a salient focal point projection to coordinate forecasts. Point projections provide a unique single
focal point on the rational expectations equilibrium forecast and should lead to the lowest levels
of disagreement. Point&Density also provides a greater focus on a one-standard-deviation range
of predicted inflation values. Group treatments have a high degree of strategic complementarities;
improved coordination due to the projections is also predicted to lower forecast errors.
The effects of communicating uncertainty in central bank projections on central bank credibil-
ity will depend on how credibility is measured. We can measure a participant’s credibility in the
forecast as their willingness to use the communicated point projection. A density forecast would
’wash out’ the focal power of point projections, which undermines the ability of point projections
to coordinate expectations. In this case, we would expect credibility to be higher in Point than
Point&Density. Alternatively, in Point&Density, we can calculate credibility as a participant’s
willingness to forecast within the central bank’s forecasted one-standard deviation range. With
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this broader definition of credibility, there is more scope for the Point&Density projection to be
perceived as credible.
Projections serve two purposes to our subjects in our experiment. The projections reduce the
cognitive burden associated with correctly forecasting future inflation (information motive). In
Group treatments, aggregate expectations are the predominant driver of inflation dynamics, and a
subject who aligns her expectations with aggregate (median) expectations is likely to form more
accurate expectations. That is, in the Group treatments, inflation projections also provide a salient
focal point to coordinate forecasts (strategic motive). From this perspective, we expect that projec-
tions will be more widely used and be more effective at managing and coordinating expectations
in the Group treatments than Individual treatments. This logic aligns with the idea that agents
react strongly to public information in environments featuring strategic complementarities, since
public signals in these settings are information of the actions of others (i.e. they reduce strategic
uncertainty).
On the other hand, the strategic motive to use the projections may be absent in Group treatments
if participants do not believe the median forecaster(s) will incorporate the communication into their
private forecasts. Participants’ best response would be to incorporate their perception of aggregate
expectations into their forecast. Furthermore, any increase in central bank uncertainty should
make Group participants less confident that the median forecaster will adhere to the central bank’s
forecast. In this case, projections may be more effective at managing expectations in the Individual
treatments than Group treatments.
It is not immediately apparent whether strategic considerations present in the Group treatments
will lead to an increased usage of the central bank projections. However, given past experimen-
tal evidence that central bank communication can be a useful coordination device (Cornand and
Heinemann, 2014; Mokhtarzadeh and Petersen, 2020), we expect the strategic motive to be suffi-
ciently powerful. Increased credibility in the projections in the Group treatments should then lead
to more ex-ante rational forecasting, less inflation volatility, and lower forecast errors.
There are some key differences between Individual and Group hypotheses, specifically in the
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NoComm treatment. Without strategic concerns or an obvious focal point, Individual participants
are likely to exhibit more heterogeneity in their inflation forecasts. This, in turn, can lead to
higher mean inflation variability if some participants employ more extreme extrapolative forecast-
ing heuristics in Individual than Group. At the same time, participants in Individual have full
information about the aggregate forecasts influencing inflation (as it is their own forecasts) and,
consequently, should form smaller forecast errors and be more confident about their own expecta-
tions than Group participants.
Furthermore, we predict that private uncertainty will be lower in the Individual than in the
Group treatments. This is because Individual participants face no uncertainty about the aggregate
forecast and thus the expected path of inflation. Similarly, in the absence of strategic complemen-
tarities, Individual participants are less likely to be coordinated in their forecasts and so should
exhibit more disagreement.
We summarize these aggregate and individual-level predictions in the following hypotheses:
H1.a Inflation volatilityNoComm > Inflation volatilityPoint&Density > Inflation volatilityPoint
H1.b Inflation volatilityGroup,NoComm > Inflation volatilityIndividual,NoComm
H1.c Inflation volatilityIndividual,Point,Point&Density > Inflation volatilityGroup,Point,Point&Density
H2.a Forecast errorsNoComm > Forecast errorsPoint&Density > Forecast errorsPoint
H2.b Forecast errorsGroup,NoComm > Forecast errorsIndividual,NoComm
H2.c Forecast errorsIndividual,Point,Point&Density > Forecast errorsGroup,Point,Point&Density
H3.a DisagreementNoComm > DisagreementPoint&Density > DisagreementPoint
H3.b DisagreementIndividual > DisagreementGroup
H4.a UncertaintyNoComm > UncertaintyPoint&Density > UncertaintyPoint
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H4.b UncertaintyGroup > UncertaintyIndividual
H5.a CredibilityPoint > CredibilityPoint&Density
H5.b CredibilityGroup > CredibilityIndividual
4.3 Results
We begin by describing how point and density projections influence aggregate dynamics. We
then explore how the projections influence individual forecasting behavior.
4.3.1 Aggregate results
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 compare the time series of inflation for groups and individuals, re-
spectively, across our three information treatments by sequence and repetition.8 Time series com-
paring Group and Individual treatments can be found in the Online Appendix Section C. While
the variability of inflation certainly differs across treatments, impressive is the contemporaneous
correlation of inflation across treatments and independent groups of participants who face the same
shock sequence.
We consider two measures of macroeconomic stability at the session-repetition level. First,
we compute the mean deviation of inflation from the central bank’s target of zero. Second, we
compute the standard deviation of inflation. The mean values of both measures are presented in
the first two columns of Table 4.2. Both metrics indicate that inflation variability is greatest in
NoComm, followed by Point&Density, and lowest in Point. A series of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests
fails to reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of these statistics are not different across
treatments (N = 6 per treatment; p > 0.12 in all treatment-repetition pairwise comparisons). Our
results remain qualitatively similar when we instead normalize the session-level standard deviation
measures by the standard deviation of the realized shocks, which differ across sessions. Overall,
we are unable to find support for Hypothesis 1a that either type of projection reduces inflation
variability in Group settings.
8We use the terms sequence and session interchangeably.
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Figure 4.3: Time series of Group treatments
In the Individual sessions, we obtain the same ordering of treatments with NoComm exhibit-
ing the most inflation volatility (71 bps), followed by Point&Density (62 bps) and Point (59 bps).
The differences between NoComm and Point are statistically significant in Rep. 2 (N = 39 in
NoComm, N = 42 in Point; p = 0.02 for both the raw and normalized standard deviation mea-
sures). All other treatment-repetition differences are not statistically significant (p > 0.12). We
find minimal support for Hypothesis 1a that either type of projection reduces inflation variability
in Individual settings.
We do not find significant support for Hypothesis 1b and 1c that inflation volatility is sig-
nificantly different across Group and Individual treatments. While mean inflation variability is
more than 50% greater in Individual treatments than Group treatments, there is considerable vari-
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Figure 4.4: Time series of Individual treatments
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ance across Individual subjects within any given treatment. The differences between Group and
Individual treatments for a given information set are not statistically significant (N = 6 in Group
treatments andN ≥ 34 in Individual treatments; p > 0.17 in all treatment-repetition comparisons).
Result 1: In Group settings, projections do not significantly improve inflation stability.
Result 2: In Individual settings, only point projections significantly reduce inflation vari-
ability for experienced participants.
4.3.2 Individual results
We now turn to our individual–level forecast data to identify participants’ ability and forecast-
ing strategies. We keep data only from those participants whose forecasts are within ±1500 bps.
This excludes five participants from each of the Point–Indiv. and Point&Density–Indiv. treatments.
Forecast Errors
Distributions of the forecast errors are presented in Figure 4.5 by repetition and coordination type,
with the densities truncated at 600 for better clarity. Given the minimal differences in the distribu-
tion of forecast errors across treatments, we henceforth pool data from the two repetitions together.
Forecast summary statistics of individual inflation forecasts are presented in Table 4.2. The third
and fourth columns present the mean and standard deviation of absolute forecast errors of t + 1
and t+ 2 inflation by treatment.
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Figure 4.5: Distributions of absolute forecast errors
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics of aggregate and individual forecast variables
Group
CB Deviation Std. Dev. Abs.FE Abs.FE Disagreement Disagreement Uncertainty Uncertainty Credibility Credibility
Projection from Target Inflation πt+1 πt+2 πt+1 πt+2 πt+1 πt+2 πt+1 πt+2
NoComm 39 43 36 43 32 31 27 32 15% 16%
(37) (22) (56) (55) (46) (40) (37) (92) (0.35) (0.36)
Point 32 38 31 35 17 16 17 21 41% 41%
(24) (9) (28) (27) (14) (10) (17) (24) (0.49) (0.49)
Point&Density 34 40 34 38 21 21 30 35 34% 37%




CB Deviation Std. Dev. Abs.FE Abs.FE Disagreement Disagreement Uncertainty Uncertainty Credibility Credibility
Projection from Target Inflation πt+1 πt+2 πt+1 πt+2 πt+1 πt+2 πt+1 πt+2
NoComm 66 117 43 57 74 73 23 26 11% 11%
(79) (89) (68) (80) (44) (45) (45) (35) (0.11) (0.32)
Point 51 53 37 43 66 62 19 21 36% 35%
(93) (41) (68) (82) (70) (68) (29) (29) (0.48) (0.48)
Point&Density 58 65 36 47 65 61 24 26 23% 24%
(73) (60) (51) (62) (45) (45) (28) (30) (0.42) (0.43)
86%† 91%†
(0.35) (0.28)
This table presents means and standard deviation for each variable by treatment. Units are given in basis points, except for Credibility
which is the percentage of participants who forecast the central bank’s projected value within 5 bps. † denotes the percentage of forecasts
that fall within the central bank’s projected range in the PointDensity treatment.
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We find mixed support for Hypothesis 2a that projections reduce forecast errors, with Point
projections more effective than Point&Density projections at improving forecast accuracy. Con-
sistent across both groups and individuals, as well as one- and two-period-ahead forecasts, we find
that absolute forecast errors are largest in the NoComm, followed by Point&Density, and lowest in
the Point treatments.
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Table 4.3: Absolute forecast errors
Panel A: Information comparisons
Group Individual
t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 1 t+ 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Point -5.057 -7.829** -6.460 -13.082*
(3.37) (3.32) (5.71) (6.99)
Point&Density -2.155 2.902* -4.795 3.034* -7.376 -0.916 -9.759 3.322
(3.51) (1.52) (3.47) (1.72) (4.94) (4.93) (6.61) (6.04)
α 35.901*** 30.844*** 42.690*** 34.862*** 43.161*** 36.701*** 56.678*** 43.596***
(3.26) (0.82) (3.17) (1.00) (4.05) (4.03) (5.30) (4.56)
N 7306 4872 7054 4704 6604 4343 6377 4194
χ2 5.237 3.629 7.437 3.094 2.336 0.0346 3.684 0.303
Panel B: Group vs. Individual comparisons
NoComm Point Point&Density
t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 1 t+ 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual 7.260 13.986** 5.858 8.735* 2.040 9.023**
(5.21) (6.18) (4.11) (4.67) (3.11) (4.20)
α 35.901*** 42.691*** 30.844*** 34.862*** 33.746*** 37.896***
(3.27) (3.17) (0.82) (1.00) (1.29) (1.41)
N 4695 4533 4720 4558 4495 4340
χ2 1.946 5.120 2.028 3.500 0.430 4.623
This table presents results from a series of random effects panel regressions. Units are given in basis points. The dependent variables
are the absolute one- and two-period-ahead absolute forecast errors of inflation. Point, Point&Density, and Individual are treatment-
specific dummy variables. α denotes the estimated constant. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,
and ***p < 0.01.
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To evaluate whether the differences are statistically significant, we conduct a series of ran-
dom effects panel regressions where we regress absolute forecast errors on treatment-specific
dummy variables. Table 4.3 Panel A presents the results for Group treatments in columns (1)
to (4) and Individual treatments in columns (5) to (8). Odd columns compare the two projec-
tion treatments to the NoComm treatment (denoted by α). The even columns compare forecast
errors in Point&Density to Point. While forecast errors do decline with projections, the effect is
not statistically significant in the Group treatments for one-period-ahead forecasts. Two-period-
ahead inflation forecast errors are significantly lower when a Point projection is communicated.
Columns (2) and (4) show that adding a density forecast to an existing point forecast can lead to a
small but statistically significant increase in both one- and two-period-ahead forecast errors. In the
Individual treatments, point projections significantly decrease two-period-ahead forecast errors by
roughly 14 bps. Overall, however, the projections do not have a consistent effect on one-period-
ahead forecasts.
Table 4.3 Panel B presents the estimated effects of eliminating strategic motives on abso-
lute forecast errors, by treatment. Individual is a dummy variable that takes the value of one
if participants are in the Individual treatment, with the Group treatment taken as the baseline.
Consistently, two-period-ahead forecast errors are more extreme in Individual treatments than in
Group treatments. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level in the NoComm and
Point&Density treatments, and 10% level in the Point treatment. On average, one-period-ahead
forecast errors are also larger in the Individual treatments, but the effect is not statistically sig-
nificant. Thus, we reject Hypothesis 2b that forecast errors in NoComm-Indiv. are lower than
in No-Comm Group, and find some support for Hypothesis 2c that errors are smaller in Group
treatments with central bank projections.
Result 3: Point projections significantly reduce t + 2 ahead forecast errors, and are sig-
nificantly more effective than Point&Density projections in Group treatments.
Result 4: Participants in Individual treatments form significantly larger forecast errors
about t+ 2 inflation than their Group counterparts.
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Results 3 and 4 coincide with our hypotheses. The fact that projections are more effective at
reducing forecast errors for t + 2 than t + 1 is likely due to the additional cognitive complexity
associated with forecasting further into the future. Regarding Result 4, we note that there are more
outlier forecasts, fewer ex-ante rational subjects and considerably more trend-chasing heuristics in
Individual than Group treatments. Thus, it is not surprising that the forecast errors are larger in
Individual treatments.
Disagreement
We next consider how forecast disagreement is affected by the communication of projections. We
measure forecast disagreement at the session-period level as the standard deviation of inflation
forecasts across subjects. Mean and standard deviations of forecast disagreement are presented in
the third and fourth columns of Table 4.2. Table 4.4 provides estimates of the treatment differences
in disagreement.
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Table 4.4: Disagreement in inflation forecasts
Panel A: Information comparisons
Group Individual
t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 1 t+ 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Point -14.937** -15.685** -8.346 -11.102
(7.16) (6.31) (11.41) (9.96)
Point&Density -10.616 4.321 -10.038 5.647* -9.342 -0.997 -11.406 -0.304
(7.29) (2.83) (6.63) (3.13) (10.80) (12.50) (10.45) (11.37)
α 31.634*** 16.697*** 31.259*** 15.574*** 74.220*** 65.875*** 72.889*** 61.787***
(6.95) (1.76) (6.08) (1.68) (6.80) (9.22) (6.36) (7.72)
N 1080 720 1080 720 1080 720 1080 720
χ2 5.877 2.335 8.368 3.245 0.941 0.00635 1.753 0.000716
Panel B: Group vs. Individual comparisons
NoComm Point Point&Density
t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 1 t+ 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual 42.586*** 41.630*** 49.178*** 46.213*** 43.860*** 40.262***
(9.79) (8.86) (9.38) (7.90) (8.73) (8.76)
α 31.634*** 31.259*** 16.697*** 15.574*** 21.017*** 21.221***
(7.00) (6.13) (1.76) (1.68) (2.21) (2.65)
N 720 720 720 720 720 720
χ2 18.91 22.07 27.46 34.22 25.22 21.13
This table presents results from a series of random effects panel regressions. Units are given in basis points. The dependent
variables are the per-period standard deviations of one- and two-period-ahead forecasts of inflation, computed at the session level.
Point, Point&Density, and Individual are treatment-specific dummy variables. α denotes the estimated constant. Robust standard errors
are given in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
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We find mixed support for Hypothesis 3a that Point and Point&Density projections reduce
disagreement. Within Group treatments, we find that Point projections significantly reduce both
one- and two-period-ahead disagreement (p < 0.05 in both cases). We also find that the addi-
tional inclusion of densities around a point projection leads to a small but significant increase in
disagreement in two-period-ahead disagreement. Point&Density projections, when compared to
NoComm, do not significantly reduce disagreement. Within Individual treatments, the two types
of projections reduce disagreement across subjects by roughly ten bps, but the differences across
Communication treatments are not statistically significant at the 10% level.
Disagreement across subjects is significantly higher in the Individual treatments when no strate-
gic coordination motive is present (p < 0.001 in all communication treatments). Disagreement
falls by more than 50% in NoComm Groups, by 74% in Point Groups, and by roughly 65% in
Point+Density Groups. Thus, we fail to reject Hypothesis 3b that disagreement is higher in Indi-
vidual treatments.
Result 5: Point projections significantly reduce disagreement about future inflation, but
Point&Density projections are not consistently effective.
Result 6: Disagreement is significantly lower in the Group treatment than in the Individ-
ual treatment, i.e. when participants have a strategic motive to coordinate their forecasts.
Uncertainty
Subjects provided predictions of their forecast errors, which we take as a measure of uncertainty.
Mean and standard deviations of expected forecast errors are presented in the final two columns
of Table 4.2. Table 4.5 provides estimates of the treatment differences in participants’ conveyed
uncertainty.
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Table 4.5: Uncertainty in inflation forecasts
Panel A: Information comparisons
Group Individual
t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 1 t+ 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Point -9.377*** -11.790** -3.858 -5.129
(3.53) (4.70) (3.26) (3.61)
Point&Density 3.650 13.027*** 1.938 13.728*** 0.305 4.163 0.089 5.218
(4.06) (2.92) (4.98) (3.52) (3.47) (3.09) (3.82) (3.39)
α 26.703*** 17.326*** 32.894*** 21.105*** 23.339*** 19.482*** 26.047*** 20.918***
(3.20) (1.49) (4.15) (2.19) (2.56) (2.02) (2.85) (2.22)
N 7559 5040 7559 5040 6840 4500 6840 4500
χ2 22.96 19.92 17.30 15.20 2.301 1.811 3.142 2.376
Panel B: Group vs. Individual comparisons
NoComm Point Point&Density
t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 1 t+ 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual 27.817** 19.853* 1.017 0.656 -10.045* -13.212*
(11.53) (10.35) (8.68) (9.47) (6.08) (7.57)
α 18.392*** 23.639*** 20.903*** 22.889*** 29.136*** 34.122***
(1.81) (3.47) (4.90) (5.68) (4.92) (6.39)
N 720 720 720 720 720 720
χ2 5.822 3.681 0.0137 0.00479 2.732 3.042
This table presents results from a series of random effects panel regressions. Units are given in basis points. The dependent variables
are the participants’ expected errors in their one- and two-period-ahead forecasts of inflation. Point, Point&Density, and Individual are
treatment-specific dummy variables. α denotes the estimated constant. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. *p < 0.10,
**p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
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Immediately striking is the high level of confidence participants convey alongside their point
forecasts. The average uncertainty is approximately 30 bps in NoComm, 20 bps in Point, and
33 bps in Point&Density in Group settings and slightly lower in Individual. A rational agent
asked to convey a one-standard deviation forecast would predict an expected error of 113 bps.
Our participants are much more confident in their forecasts, conveying only one–quarter of one–
standard–deviation of a rational level of uncertainty.9
We predicted in Hypothesis 4a that uncertainty would be the highest in the NoComm treatment,
followed by Point& Density, and lowest in the Point treatment. We find significant support for this
hypothesis in both the Group and Individual treatments. Within Group treatments, one- and two-
period-ahead uncertainty decreases by approximately ten bps when the central bank communicates
a Point projection. This effect is significant at the 1% (5%) level for one- (two-) period ahead
forecasts. Communicating an auxiliary density around the point projection significantly increases
both forecast uncertainties by approximately 14 bps. This effect is significant at the 1% level. We
obtain qualitatively similar effects from projections in the Individual treatments, though the effects
are smaller and not statistically significant.
In Hypothesis 4b we predicted that introducing strategic considerations would increase par-
ticipants’ uncertainty about future inflation. We find mixed evidence to support this. Only in
the Point&Density treatment are subjects significantly more unsure about their personal forecasts
when dealing with other participants. In Point and, especially, NoComm, strategic coordination
leads to less uncertainty about future inflation.
Result 7: Point projections significantly reduce individual-level uncertainty about fore-
casts of future inflation in Group treatments, but Point&Density projections are not consis-
tently effective.
Result 8: Individuals exhibit less uncertainty about their private forecasts than Groups
9Pfajfar and Žakelj (2016) also observe a high level of overconfidence in related LtF New Keynesian experiments.
Uncertainty declines as the central bank pursues a more aggressive reaction to deviations of inflation from target and
induces more stable inflation dynamics.
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when presented with Point&Density projections.
Credibility
Credibility is an important concern for central banks who communicate their projections to the
public. We denote a participant as perceiving the central bank’s projection as credible if she uses
its projected point forecast to formulate her private expectations. Given the potential for rounding
errors, we assume a participant uses the projected value if their forecast is within five basis points of
the projection. Table 4.6 provides estimates of the treatment differences in participants’ credibility
in the central bank’s projections.
Without any communication, roughly 15% (11%) of one- and two-period-ahead forecasts in
NoComm-Group (NoComm-Indiv.) are within five basis points of the rational expectations equi-
librium forecast. Point projections are used by 41% (36%) of Group (Indiv.) subjects to formulate
their one- and two-period-ahead forecasts. Communicating a density decreases the usage of the
point projection. Credibility in the actual point prediction decreases to 34% (23%) for one-period-
ahead forecasts and 37% (24%) for two-period-ahead forecasts in the Group (Indiv.) treatments.
We can alternatively consider credibility in the Point&Density treatment to include any forecast
in the central bank’s communicated density forecast. Credibility according to this definition is 99%
for both one- and two-period ahead forecasts in the Group treatments, and between 86% and 91%
in the Individual treatments. For reference, NoComm and Point also exhibit nearly identical levels
of credibility for both variables subjects forecast. This high degree of similarly across information
treatments indicates that the density projection is not improving credibility, and, if anything, is
reducing credibility in the central bank’s point projections.
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Table 4.6: Credibility of central bank projections
Panel A: Information comparisons
Group Individual
t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 1 t+ 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Point 0.267*** 0.156*** 0.270*** 0.146***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Point&Density 0.196*** -0.071* 0.082*** -0.074*** 0.140*** -0.130*** 0.059*** -0.087***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
α 0.147*** 0.413*** 0.152*** 0.308*** 0.109*** 0.378*** 0.114*** 0.260***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
N 7559 5040 7559 5040 6840 4500 6840 4500
χ2 98.30 2.812 62.74 10.05 72.07 7.668 42.92 10.13
Panel B: Group vs. Individual comparisons
NoComm Point Point&Density
t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 1 t+ 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual -0.038** -0.038** -0.035 -0.048* -0.094** -0.061**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02)
α 0.147*** 0.152*** 0.413*** 0.308*** 0.342*** 0.234***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
N 4859 4859 4890 4890 4650 4650
χ2 6.549 6.196 0.627 3.190 4.325 6.614
This table presents results from a series of random effects panel regressions. The dependent variables are dummy variables that take the
value of one if one- and two-period-ahead forecasts of inflation are less than five basis points from the central bank’s point projection.
Point, Point&Density, and Individual are treatment-specific dummy variables. α denotes the estimated constant. Robust standard errors
are given in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, and ***p < 0.01.
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For both Group and Individual treatments, communicating either a Point or Point&Density
projection significantly increases the share of participants forecasting the REE solution for t +
1 inflation. Consistent with Hypothesis 5a, credibility in the central bank’s point projection is
significantly lower, however, when the projection includes a density forecast for both t + 1 and
t+ 2 forecasts in Group and Individual treatments.
We also observe a small but significant increase in credibility in the projections when par-
ticipants face strategic considerations. The effect is roughly four percentage points in the Point
treatments, and between 6-9 percentage points in the Point&Density treatments. Thus, we find
support for Hypothesis 5b that Group settings improve credibility in projections.
Result 9: Credibility in the central bank’s point forecast is significantly lower when the
central bank communicates a density around its point projection.
Result 10: Credibility in projections is higher when participants interact in Group treat-
ments.
Heuristics
Finally, we consider how the projections and strategic considerations alter the heuristics subjects
use to formulate their forecasts. This exercise not only provides insight into whether projections
have the intended impact on expectations, but also highlights which types of heuristics become
more or less prevalent in the presence of central bank communication. Table 4.7 presents the six
general classes of heuristics we consider. The heuristics have been previously identified by theory
and experiments as describing forecasters’ expectation formation process.
Following Mokhtarzadeh and Petersen (2020), we classify each participant into one of six
heuristics that most closely matches their own submitted expectations. Specifically, we identify the
heuristic that produces the lowest absolute mean-squared error among all competing models. For
the Constant Gain and Trend Chasing heuristics, we consider a range of parameters γ, τ ∈ [0.1, 1.5]
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Table 4.7: Forecasting heuristics
Model Heuristic Name Model




M2 Adaptive(1) Ei,tπt+1 = 0.09rt−1 + 0.88πt−1 + 0.17εt
Ei,tπt+2 = 0.10rt−1 + 0.84πt−1 + 0.18εt
M3 Target Ei,tπt+1 = 0
Ei,tπt+2 = 0
M4 Naive Ei,tπt+1 = πt−1
Ei,tπt+2 = πt−1
M5 Constant Gain Ei,tπt+1 = Ei,t−2πt−1 − γ(Ei,t−2πt−1 − πt−1)
Ei,tπt+2 = Ei,t−3πt−1 − γ(Ei,t−2πt−1 − πt−1)
M6 Trend Chasing Ei,tπt+1 = πt−1 + τ(πt−1 − πt−2)
Ei,tπt+2 = πt−1 + 2τ(πt−1 − πt−2)
Models of expectations as functions of exogenous or historical data. γ and τ ∈ [0.1, 1.5] in increments of 0.1.
with 0.1 increments. The distribution of t + 1 inflation forecasting heuristics are presented in
Figure 4.6 by treatment.
There are many interesting results to be taken away from these analyses. Without any auxiliary
communication, between 10 and 20% of participants in both Group and Individual treatments
formulate ex-ante rational expectations. Importantly, after controlling for experience, there is little
difference in the prevalence of rational agents in strategic and individual environments. This is
noteworthy as one might assume that participants’ potential irrationality in NoComm may be due to
the perceived irrationality of their counterparts. Rather, it is in the NoComm-Individual treatment
that we observe a greater frequency of highly irrational heuristics such as Trend Chasing.
Communicating a Point projection is very effective at guiding participants to forecasting the
REE solution. Roughly 80% of Group participants and 48% of Individual participants behave
as if they were forming ex-ante rational expectations when they receive Point projections. In
Point-Individual, the inflation projection effectively nudges subjects away from using Adaptive
and Trend-Chasing heuristics toward both Rational and Constant Gain. The point projection is
noticeably less effective in the Individual treatment, likely because Individual participants who do
not initially utilize the projection to formulate their forecast observe dynamics that look different
116
Figure 4.6: Distribution of forecasting heuristics for t+ 1 inflation, by treatment
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from the projected values. They subsequently lose credibility in the projections.
Density projections also increase the proportion of subjects who forecast as if they were Ex-
ante Rational and reduces the proportion of Adaptive forecasters. However, for inexperienced
Group participants and both inexperienced and experienced Individual participants, the inclusion
of the density projection mutes the effects of the point projection. In addition to the previously
noted heterogeneity in forecasts, we also observe considerably greater heterogeneity in heuristics
in Point&Density compared to Point.
Between 76 and 87% of participants use the same heuristic to forecast one- and two-period-
ahead inflation, without much difference across treatments. For those that exhibit differences, a
few consistencies emerge. Adaptive forecasters of t+ 1 inflation tend to be Rational for their t+ 2
forecasts in projection treatments. Rational forecasters of t + 1 inflation tend to be primarily split
between Target and Trend-Chasing for their subsequent forecast. Finally, those that forecast t + 1
inflation with a Trend Chasing heuristic use predominantly a Rational heuristic to forecast their
subsequent forecast, in treatments with projections.
Result 11: Ex-ante rational projections reduce the prevalence of backward-looking fore-
casting heuristics and encourage more rational forecasting.
Result 12: Point projections are more effective at guiding expectations to the REE than
Point&Density projections.
Result 13: The majority of participants use the same heuristics to formulate both their
one- and two-period-ahead forecasts.
4.4 Conclusion
As more central banks publish forecasts about their outlook, they face the dilemma as to
whether to communicate their own uncertainty. To the best of our knowledge, there has been
no work evaluating the impact of publishing density forecasts in addition to point projections on
market expectations.
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Our work aims to fill this gap by providing original evidence on the effects of communicating
uncertainty on expectation formation. First, we study the introduction of a measure of a central
bank’s forecast uncertainty into central bank projections (i.e. the publication of density rather
than point forecasts). Our interest is in how this affects aggregate dynamics and how forecasters
incorporate information in the first and second central moments into their own expectations and
perceptions of future uncertainty. Second, this paper studies behavior in individual-choice and
coordination settings to understand the extent to which strategic concerns influence how agents
use information when forming expectations.
We find that both point and density projections significantly improve forecast accuracy and
decrease cross-sectional disagreement relative to an environment with no auxiliary central bank
communication. This is consistent with empirical evidence that central bank projections coordi-
nate expectations and reduce forecast errors. Furthermore, projections increase the proportion of
participants who form ex-ante rational expectations. We provide new evidence showing that a large
majority of participants use the same heuristics to formulate both their one- and two-period-ahead
forecasts. However, roughly 20% of participants employ different heuristics when forecasting at
different horizons. These subjects tend to use more irrational heuristics for their further ahead fore-
casts. However, projections nudge more distant forecasts toward the ex-ante rational prediction.
These results are in line with Mokhtarzadeh and Petersen (2020) who find inflation projections
works effectively to guide expectations in the absence of a zero lower bound (ZLB). Inflation ex-
pectations are not as well managed by rationally–constructed inflation projections in the presence
of ZLB. See Arifovic and Petersen (2017), Ahrens et al. (2018), and Kryvtsov and Petersen (2020)
for examples of relatively poorer management of inflation expectations through projections at ZLB.
In particular, more simplistic communications are more effective to guide expectations. Kryvtsov
and Petersen note that simple, relatable information about past interest rates work more effectively
to manage expectations than forward-looking projections about policy rates and forward guidance.
Ahrens et al. find that gradual adjustment of inflation projections by human central bankers can
more effectively build up credibility and manage expectations at the ZLB. Arifovic and Petersen
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find that qualitative rather than quantitative communication can work somewhat better to reduce
pessimism.
Communicating an additional density forecast around a point projection mutes the positive
effects of publishing point projections. Compared to point projections, density projections signif-
icantly increase forecast errors and disagreement. The central bank transmits their uncertainty to
forecasters, leading to higher levels of private forecast uncertainty. Moreover, fewer subjects form
ex-ante rational expectations at both forecasting horizons.
Credibility in the central bank’s projections significantly decreases when participants are pre-
sented with a less precise projection. This result is in line with Baeriswyl and Cornand (2016)
who show in a Keynesian beauty contest environment that subjects place more weight on public
signals the more precise is the signal. Their results are more nuanced. Subjects overreact rela-
tive to theoretical predictions when the public signal is imprecise, and under-react when it is more
precise.
A notable finding in our experiment is that inflation volatility and the heterogeneity in forecasts
and heuristics increases when participants have more market power in the Individual treatments.
Other LTF experiments have also explored the effects of individual subjects’ market size on system
stability. Kopányi et al. (2019) show in an asset market LTF that increasing the market power of
more accurate forecasters can lead to greater instability. Bao et al. (2020), on the other hand,
find that asset price bubbles grow even faster with larger group sizes (where individuals have less
market power) and participants are more likely to coordinate on trend-chasing strategies. The
differences in our experimental findings and Bao et al. likely are driven by the relatively greater
negative feedback present in our data-generating process, that encourage coordination on more
stable heuristics (see Heemeijer et al. 2009 for evidence on the effects of positive and negative
feedback in LTF experiments).
We show that central bank projections both provide valuable information to reduce forecasters’
confusion and can alleviate some strategic uncertainty. Our results line up with Akiyama et al.
(2017) who show that mispricing commonly observed in experimental asset markets is driven
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at least in part by strategic uncertainty. In fact, they show that strategic uncertainty explains at
least as much of median initial forecast deviation from the fundamental value as does confusion.
Our results are consistent with the broader literature that shows individuals will anchor on simple
and salient information when facing cognitive overload (Deck and Jahedi, 2015, Kryvtsov and
Petersen, 2020).
Much of the macroeconomic literature uses a notion of rational expectations that focuses on
an agents’ point forecast of some future event. There is scope in learning-to-forecast experiments
to better understand participants’ subjective uncertainty, how it relates to rationality, and how the
relationship between rationality and uncertainty can be influenced by monetary policy and central
bank communication. We find that participants exhibit an unusually high level of confidence in
their own forecasts, and this confidence can be better strengthened through more precise informa-
tion. An important avenue of future study is whether participants would act on expectations given
their level of confidence.
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation presents three projects focused on central banking. In particular, this dis-
sertation aims to understand emerging practices in central bank communication and to explore
unconventional monetary policy alternatives. Together, these three chapters constitute my effort to
better understand some of the primary tools available to policymakers who find themselves con-
strained at or near the effective lower bound and in need of alternative methods of stimulating
economic activity.
In chapter one of this dissertation, I introduce a flexible experimental framework that serves as
a testbed for monetary policy, fiscal policy, and central bank communication. Crucially, this frame-
work provides a way for academics and policymakers alike to generate much-needed empirical data
to guide real-world policy decisions. Though the laboratory necessarily abstracts away from some
real-world frictions, this framework provides a low-cost, low-risk way for researchers to explore
policy alternatives under tightly-controlled conditions. We then use this framework to investigate
the ability of unconventional monetary policies to alleviate deflationary traps and achieve liftoff at
the zero lower bound. We find that central bank intervention into deflationary traps via inflation
targeting consistently fails to close output and employment gaps and to align aggregate inflation
with the central bank’s inflation target. This result is consistent with Arifovic and Petersen (2017),
who find that neither qualitative nor quantitative communication of higher inflation targets in a
liquidity trap is sufficient to stimulate inflation expectations in a learning-to-forecast experimental
environment. Removing the zero lower bound and allowing interest rates to become negative, on
the other hand, reliably aligns aggregate inflation in our experimental economies with the central
bank’s targeted full-employment, inflationary equilibria. Our results suggest that policies aimed at
stimulating aggregate demand through increased real wealth balances are more effective than those
relying on rational expectations.
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Chapter two considers the BoE’s density forecasts and its revisions to quantify the effects of
information flow on the financial markets and expectations. The paper contributes to the broader
literature on the effects of news on financial markets and to the emerging literature on how informa-
tion in the higher-order moments of central bank forecasts matters from a policy perspective. We
find that financial markets respond at least as strongly to the information contained in the higher-
order moments of the BoE’s density forecasts of output growth and inflation as to the information
contained in the corresponding first moments. further, we find that both the magnitude and di-
rection of responses are state-contingent. Additionally, we use Blue Chip Financial Forecast data
to study how professional forecasters respond to information contained in higher-order forecast
moments. We find that the consensus forecast and level of forecast disagreement of both short-
and long-term interest rates are strongly correlated with higher-order forecast moments. Further,
we observe a logical coherence between private expectations and realized yield changes, suggest-
ing that market participants understand how rates will respond to higher-order forecast moments.
Overall, our results suggest that communicating high-order forecasts moments to market partic-
ipants does affect their subsequent behavior. Important from a policy perspective is that higher-
order moments can move markets, which suggests that density forecasting is a viable policy option.
ur work aims to fill this gap by providing original evidence on the effects of communicating un-
certainty on expectation formation. First, we study the introduction of a measure of a central bank’s
forecast uncertainty into central bank projections (i.e. the publication of density rather than point
forecasts). Our interest is in how this affects aggregate dynamics and how forecasters incorporate
information in the first and second central moments into their own expectations and perceptions
of future uncertainty. Second, this paper studies behavior in individual-choice and coordination
settings to understand the extent to which strategic concerns influence how agents use information
when forming expectations.
We find that both point and density projections significantly improve forecast accuracy and
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decrease cross-sectional disagreement relative to an environment with no auxiliary central bank
communication. This is consistent with empirical evidence that central bank projections coordi-
nate expectations and reduce forecast errors. Furthermore, projections increase the proportion of
participants who form ex-ante rational expectations. We provide new evidence showing that a large
majority of participants use the same heuristics to formulate both their one- and two-period-ahead
forecasts. However, roughly 20% of participants employ different heuristics when forecasting at
different horizons. These subjects tend to use more irrational heuristics for their further ahead fore-
casts. However, projections nudge more distant forecasts toward the ex-ante rational prediction.
These results are in line with Mokhtarzadeh and Petersen (2020) who find inflation projections
works effectively to guide expectations in the absence of a zero lower bound (ZLB). Inflation ex-
pectations are not as well managed by rationally–constructed inflation projections in the presence
of ZLB. See Arifovic and Petersen (2017), Ahrens et al. (2018), and Kryvtsov and Petersen (2020)
for examples of relatively poorer management of inflation expectations through projections at ZLB.
In particular, more simplistic communications are more effective to guide expectations. Kryvtsov
and Petersen note that simple, relatable information about past interest rates work more effectively
to manage expectations than forward-looking projections about policy rates and forward guidance.
Ahrens et al. find that gradual adjustment of inflation projections by human central bankers can
more effectively build up credibility and manage expectations at the ZLB. Arifovic and Petersen
find that qualitative rather than quantitative communication can work somewhat better to reduce
pessimism.
Chapter three of this dissertation uses a ’learning to forecast’ experiment based around a three-
equation New Keynesian model to study the effect of introducing uncertaitny into central bank
communications. We find that communicating uncertainty via density bands surrounding a point
projection mutes the positive effects of publishing point projections. Compared to point projec-
tions, density projections significantly increase forecast errors and disagreement. The central bank
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transmits their uncertainty to forecasters, leading to higher levels of private forecast uncertainty.
Moreover, fewer subjects form ex-ante rational expectations at both forecasting horizons. Credi-
bility in the central bank’s projections significantly decreases when participants are presented with
a less precise projection. This result is in line with Baeriswyl and Cornand (2016) who show in a
Keynesian beauty contest environment that subjects place more weight on public signals the more
precise is the signal. Their results are more nuanced. Subjects overreact relative to theoretical
predictions when the public signal is imprecise, and under-react when it is more precise. A no-
table finding in our experiment is that inflation volatility and the heterogeneity in forecasts and
heuristics increases when participants have more market power in the Individual treatments. Other
LTF experiments have also explored the effects of individual subjects’ market size on system sta-
bility. Kopányi et al. (2019) show in an asset market LTF that increasing the market power of
more accurate forecasters can lead to greater instability. Bao et al. (2020), on the other hand,
find that asset price bubbles grow even faster with larger group sizes (where individuals have less
market power) and participants are more likely to coordinate on trend-chasing strategies. The dif-
ferences in our experimental findings and Bao et al. likely are driven by the relatively greater
negative feedback present in our data-generating process, that encourage coordination on more
stable heuristics (see Heemeijer et al. 2009 for evidence on the effects of positive and negative
feedback in LTF experiments). We show that central bank projections both provide valuable infor-
mation to reduce forecasters’ confusion and can alleviate some strategic uncertainty. Our results
line up with Akiyama et al. (2017) who show that mispricing commonly observed in experimental
asset markets is driven at least in part by strategic uncertainty. In fact, they show that strategic
uncertainty explains at least as much of median initial forecast deviation from the fundamental
value as does confusion. Our results are consistent with the broader literature that shows indi-
viduals will anchor on simple and salient information when facing cognitive overload (Deck and
Jahedi, 2015, Kryvtsov and Petersen, 2020). Much of the macroeconomic literature uses a notion
of rational expectations that focuses on an agents’ point forecast of some future event. There is
scope in learning-to-forecast experiments to better understand participants’ subjective uncertainty,
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how it relates to rationality, and how the relationship between rationality and uncertainty can be
influenced by monetary policy and central bank communication. We find that participants exhibit
an unusually high level of confidence in their own forecasts, and this confidence can be better
strengthened through more precise information. An important avenue of future study is whether





EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING
Welcome! You are here to participate in an economic experiment. If you read these instructions
carefully and make appropriate decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money. We will
pay you this money in cash immediately after this experiment.
Each of you will earn $10 for attending. This is your show-up fee. Throughout this experiment
you will also earn points based on the decisions you make. Every point you earn is worth an addi-
tional $0.50. We reserve the right to improve the show up fee in your favour if average payoffs are
lower than expected.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. Please
raise your hand if you have any questions. An experimenter will answer your questions privately.
You will be excluded from the experiment and deprived of all payments aside from the show-up
fee if you do not comply with these instructions.
This experiment is based on a simple simulation that approximates fluctuations in a real econ-
omy. Your task is to serve as private forecasters and provide real–time forecasts about future
inflation in this simulated economy. These instructions will explain what inflation and the interest
rate are, how they move around in this economy, and how they depend on your forecasts. We will
allow you to practice making forecasts for several unpaid periods before we begin paid periods in
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this experiment. You will then participate in two sequences of 30 paid periods, for a total of 60
paid periods of play.
In this simulation, households and firms (whose decisions are automated by the computer) will
form forecasts identically to yours. So to some degree, outcomes that you will see in the game
will depend on the way in which all of you form your forecasts. However, your earnings in this
experiment depend on the accuracy of your individual forecasts.
You will also submit a measure of uncertainty about your forecast called your anticipated fore-
casting error. You will earn money if actual inflation is within the bounds of this error. Otherwise,
you will earn nothing.
Please note that all values are given in basis points, a measurement often used in descriptions
of the economy. All values can be positive, negative, or zero at any point in time.
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Overview of the Economy
In each period, you will submit a forecast of inflation for the next two periods. For example, sup-
pose it is now period 10. Then you will submit a forecast of inflation in period 11 and a forecast
of inflation in period 12. By ‘forecast of inflation’ we mean your best guess of what inflation will
be. The more accurate your guess, the more money you will earn.
Your forecasts should be given in basis points. Here are some examples of the relationship between
basis points and percentages:
1% = 100 basis points
3.25% = 325 basis points
-0.5% = -50 basis points
-4.8% = -480 basis points
You can submit any forecast you wish, positive or negative or zero, but please only submit integers.
The economy consists of three main variables:
• Inflation – Inflation is the change in price that occurs between two periods.
• Interest Rates – The interest rate is the amount of money that people earn on savings. A
higher interest rate entices consumers to save more and spend less on consumption. Thus, a
higher interest rate puts downward pressure on inflation.
• Shocks – Shocks are changes to the amount consumers in the economy wish to purchase.
Shocks change every period and are influenced by a random component and by past shocks.
A positive shock today increases inflation today and vice versa.
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Your goal in this experiment is to forecast future inflation as accurately as possible. Thus, we now
provide detailed explanations of the factors that influence inflation and the relationships between
the different variables in the economy.
Shocks:
Intuitively, you can think of shocks as weather shocks. Over the long run, the weather has no effect
on how much consumers want to buy. However, from day to day, there may be random changes
to the weather that do influence what people do and buy. You can think of a positive shock as
unexpectedly nice weather. When the weather is especially nice, consumers are spending more
time out of their homes and increasing their expenditures (for example, buying ice cream, going
out for a nice dinner, or going to the beach). A negative shock can be thought of as unexpectedly
terrible weather. This bad weather makes it so that people do now want to leave their homes, caus-
ing expenditures to be relatively low. Gradually, the shocks, like weather, will revert back to their
long-run levels. As the shocks dissipate, new random events occur that will make consumers want
to increase or decrease their spending. Shocks will have a precise value and will be displayed on
your screen.
Whenever a positive shock occurs and spending increases, this will put upward pressure on prices
(i.e. upward pressure on inflation). Conversely, a negative shock will put downward pressure on
prices (i.e. downward pressure on inflation).
We calculate the values of a shock in each period as follows:
Shockp = 0.57(Shockp−1) +RandomComponentp
• The random component is 0 on average
• Roughly two out of three times the shock will be between -138 and 138 basis points.
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• 95% of the time the shock will be between -276 and 276 basis points
For example, shocks may evolve as follows:
Shock1 = 30
Shock2 = 30× 0.57 +New Draw
= 17.1 + (newdraw)
Shock2 = 17.1 + (−150)
= −132.9
Shock3 = −132.9× .57 +New Draw
= ...
Interest Rates: The central bank in this economy will adjust the nominal interest rate in each
period to keep inflation as close to zero as possible. As inflation increases, the central bank will
increase the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one with inflation. An increase in the nomi-
nal interest rate has a direct negative effect on consumer demand and production, and an indirect
negative effect on inflation. Importantly, you will not observe the current interest rate when you
are forming your inflation forecasts. After you submit your forecasts, the computer will solve
for the current period’s inflation using the median forecasts from all subjects in the room and the
current-period shock shock (which you will see). It is important for you to realize that, even though
the central bank is aiming for zero inflation, it will rarely accomplish this. This is because of the
random shocks that occur in each period and the public’s expectations. However, the central bank
will keep the economy more stable than the economy would be in the absence of the central bank.
How the economy evolves:
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Each period, you and the other forecasters in this room will submit your beliefs about inflation for
the next period and the period after that. To be clear, if we are in period 10, you will submit an
inflation forecast for period 11 and for period 12. The software will select the median of each of
the two forecasts as the aggregate forecasts. The software uses the median, rather than the average
forecast, so that a small number of subjects cannot have a significant effect on the economy.
These aggregate forecasts play an important role in determining inflation today. This is because
inflation today is determined largely by aggregate forecasts about future inflation. If the majority
of forecasters expect relatively high inflation tomorrow, then inflation today will be higher. The
idea behind this is simple: If the professional forecasters communicate to the public that inflation
is likely to rise tomorrow, consumers will spend more immediately to avoid paying the relatively
higher prices tomorrow. This increase in demand today will cause prices to start rising today, and
so inflation will increase today. Likewise, if the median forecaster predicts higher inflation for
two days from now, households will need to have a bit more money tomorrow than they would
otherwise to avoid paying the higher prices predicted for two days from now.
More precisely, inflation and interest rates evolve according to the following equations:
Inflationt = 1.54(Median forecast of Inflationt+1)− 0.58(Median forecast of Inflationt+2)
+0.08(Shockt)
Interest Ratet = 4.44(Median forecast of Inflationt+1)− 3.12(Median forecast of Inflationt+2)
+ 0.41(Shockt)
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Important information about this economy:
• The Central Bank sets the target inflation at zero. In order to achieve this target it will adjust
the nominal interest rate in each period. In some cases the nominal interest rate can become
negative.
• Expectations about tomorrow (if in period 10, this is your forecast for period 11) are self-
fulfilling in this economy. If you forecast higher inflation tomorrow then inflation will grow
higher in the current period. Similarly, a median forecast of lower inflation tomorrow will
cause inflation to fall in the current period.
• Expectations about two days from now (if in period 10, this is your forecast for period 12)
relate negatively to inflation today. If you forecast higher inflation for two-days from now,
then inflation today will fall. If instead you forecast lower inflation for two days from now,
inflation today will increase.
Score
Your forecasting score in each period will depend on the accuracy of the forecasts you formed
in the previous two periods. At the end of each period, the software will evaluate how accurate
your forecasts from one- and two-periods ago were about the inflation rate in the current period.
The difference between these numbers forms your absolute forecast error. The larger this absolute
error, the lower is your forecasting score in that period. The letter p in the following example
stands for ‘period’.
• Absolute Forecast Error = ‖Your Forecast− Actual Value‖
• Total Scorep =0.3(2−AbsoluteForecastErrorp−1 + 2−AbsoluteForecastErrorp−2)
The maximum score you can earn for forecasting in each period is 0.60 points. Your score will
decrease exponentially as your forecast error increases. Suppose your forecast errors for inflation
is:
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0: Your score will be 0.6
50: Your score will be 0.42
100: Your score will be 0.30
200: Your score will be 0.15
300: Your score will be 0.075
500: Your score will be 0.02
1000: Your score will be 0
2000: Your score will be 0
Making decisions in this experiment
During this experiment, your main screen will display information that will help you make
forecasts and earn more points.
At the top left of the screen, you will see your subject number, the current period, time remain-
ing, and the total number of points you’ve earned through the previous period. You will also see
three history plots on your screen.
The top history plot displays past interest rates and current and past shocks.
The second history plot shows your 1-period-ahead points forecasts of inflation (blue dots), er-
ror bands that you create with your anticipated forecasting error (blue shading centered around your
point forecasts) and actual inflation (red dots). Note that the difference between your forecasts of
one-period-ahead inflation (blue dots) and the actual levels of inflation (red dots) constitutes your
one-period-ahead forecast error in past periods.
The third history plot shows your 2-period-ahead point forecasts of inflation (orange dots), error
bands that you create with your anticipated forecasting error (orange shading centered around your
point forecasts), and actual inflation (red dots). Note that the difference between your forecasts of
two-period-ahead inflation (orange dots) and the actual levels of inflation (red dots) constitute your
two-period-ahead forecast error in past periods.
Note: this section read one of three ways depending upon treatment:
For NoComm, skip directly to "You have 65 seconds...
For Point treatments:
Both the second and third plots also contain the Central Bank’s forecast of inflation for the next
five periods (green). It is important to remember that the projections are simply a forecast and not
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a promise. The Central Bank uses the model discussed earlier in these instructions, and the current
and expected future shocks, to form its projections. In particular, it predicts that the economy will
return to zero levels of inflation in the near future.
For Point&Density treatments:
Both the second and third plots also contain the Central Bank’s forecast of inflation for the next five
periods (green). This forecasts also includes green shading, which represents the Central Bank’s
level of uncertainty for its corresponding point projections. These bands will contain the correct
realization of inflation about 66% of the time. It is important to remember that the projections are
simply a forecast and not a promise. The Central Bank uses the model discussed earlier in these
instructions, and the current and expected future shocks, to form its projections. In particular, it
predicts that the economy will return to zero levels of inflation in the near future.
You have 65 seconds to make decisions in the first nine periods and only 50 seconds thereafter.
You may submit both negative and positive forecasts and forecasts of 0. Please review your fore-
casts before pressing the SUBMIT button because you cannot revise your forecasts afterward.
The anticipated forecast error:
You must also submit a measure of how uncertain you are about your inflation forecasts. We
call this your anticipated forecasting error.Note this value should always be positive and your error
bounds are centered around your point forecast.
Suppose you forecast inflation tomorrow to be 10 basis points but feel more confident that ac-
tual inflation will fall between 5 and 15 basis points. You should indicate this by submitting an
anticipated forecasting error of 5. This forms anticipated error bounds of 5 to 15 since 10− 5 = 5
and 10 + 5 = 15. If actual inflation is any number from 5 to 15, we pay you. Otherwise, you earn
nothing for this anticipated forecasting error.
If actual inflation falls within your anticipated forecast error bounds, then we pay your antici-
pated forecast error according to the following function:
AnticipatedErrorEarnings = 15
10+anticipated error
Notice that your earnings for your anticipated forecast error decrease as your anticipated fore-
cast error increases. However, it is important for you to understand that we pay you this amount
ONLY if the realized value of inflation lies inside your anticipated forecasting error bands. If actual
inflation is outside your anticipated forecasting error bands, then you earn 0 points for providing
your anticipated forecasting error.
An example: Suppose it is period 3. Suppose in periods 1 and 2 you provided an inflation
forecast of 10 basis points for period 3 inflation. Suppose your anticipated forecasting error in
period 1 was 5 and in period 2 it was 10. Then your error bounds for period 1 are 5 to 15 and for
period 2 are 0 to 20. Suppose actual inflation at the end of period 3 is 17. Then you earn 0 points
for your anticipated forecast error provided in period 1. This is because 17 is not between 5 and
15. However, you would earn 15
10+10
= .75 points for your anticipated forecast error provided in
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period 2, since 17 is between 0 and 20.
Our software will randomly select (with equal probability) to pay you for either your point
forecasts or for your anticipated forecast error in each period of play. We will never pay for both
in a single period.
A.1.2 Individual Instructions
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF ECONOMIC DECISION MAKING
Welcome! You are here to participate in an economic experiment. If you read these instructions
carefully and make appropriate decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money. We will
pay you this money in cash immediately after this experiment.
Each of you will earn $10 for attending. This is your show-up fee. Throughout this experiment
you will also earn points based on the decisions you make. Every point you earn is worth an addi-
tional $0.50. We reserve the right to improve the show up fee in your favour if average payoffs are
lower than expected.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. Please
raise your hand if you have any questions. An experimenter will answer your questions privately.
You will be excluded from the experiment and deprived of all payments aside from the show-up
fee if you do not comply with these instructions.
This experiment is based on a simple simulation that approximates fluctuations in a real econ-
omy. Your task is to serve as the sole private forecaster in your own economy and provide real–time
forecasts about future inflation in this simulated economy. These instructions will explain what in-
flation and the interest rate are, how they move around in this economy, and how they depend on
your forecasts. We will allow you to practice making forecasts for several unpaid periods before
we begin paid periods in this experiment. You will then participate in two sequences of 30 paid
periods, for a total of 60 paid periods of play.
In this simulation, households and firms (whose decisions are automated by the computer) will
form forecasts identically to yours. Your earnings in this experiment depend on the accuracy of
your individual forecasts.
You will also submit a measure of uncertainty about your forecast called your anticipated fore-
casting error. You will earn money if actual inflation is within the bounds of this error. Otherwise,
you will earn nothing.
Please note that all values are given in basis points, a measurement often used in descriptions
of the economy. All values can be positive, negative, or zero at any point in time.
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Overview of the Economy
In each period, you will submit a forecast of inflation for the next two periods. For example, sup-
pose it is now period 10. Then you will submit a forecast of inflation in period 11 and a forecast
of inflation in period 12. By ‘forecast of inflation’ we mean your best guess of what inflation will
be. The more accurate your guess, the more money you will earn.
Your forecasts should be given in basis points. Here are some examples of the relationship between
basis points and percentages:
1% = 100 basis points
3.25% = 325 basis points
-0.5% = -50 basis points
-4.8% = -480 basis points
You can submit any forecast you wish, positive or negative or zero, but please only submit integers.
The economy consists of three main variables:
• Inflation – Inflation is the change in price that occurs between two periods.
• Interest Rates – The interest rate is the amount of money that people earn on savings. A
higher interest rate entices consumers to save more and spend less on consumption. Thus, a
higher interest rate puts downward pressure on inflation.
• Shocks – Shocks are changes to the amount consumers in the economy wish to purchase.
Shocks change every period and are influenced by a random component and by past shocks.
A positive shock today increases inflation today and vice versa.
Your goal in this experiment is to forecast future inflation as accurately as possible. Thus, we now
provide detailed explanations of the factors that influence inflation and the relationships between
the different variables in the economy.
Shocks:
Intuitively, you can think of shocks as weather shocks. Over the long run, the weather has no effect
on how much consumers want to buy. However, from day to day, there may be random changes
to the weather that do influence what people do and buy. You can think of a positive shock as
unexpectedly nice weather. When the weather is especially nice, consumers are spending more
time out of their homes and increasing their expenditures (for example, buying ice cream, going
out for a nice dinner, or going to the beach). A negative shock can be thought of as unexpectedly
terrible weather. This bad weather makes it so that people do now want to leave their homes, caus-
ing expenditures to be relatively low. Gradually, the shocks, like weather, will revert back to their
long-run levels. As the shocks dissipate, new random events occur that will make consumers want
to increase or decrease their spending. Shocks will have a precise value and will be displayed on
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your screen.
Whenever a positive shock occurs and spending increases, this will put upward pressure on prices
(i.e. upward pressure on inflation). Conversely, a negative shock will put downward pressure on
prices (i.e. downward pressure on inflation).
We calculate the values of a shock in each period as follows:
Shockp = 0.57(Shockp−1) +RandomComponentp
• The random component is 0 on average
• Roughly two out of three times the shock will be between -138 and 138 basis points.
• 95% of the time the shock will be between -276 and 276 basis points
For example, shocks may evolve as follows:
Shock1 = 30
Shock2 = 30× 0.57 +New Draw
= 17.1 + (newdraw)
Shock2 = 17.1 + (−150)
= −132.9
Shock3 = −132.9× .57 +New Draw
= ...
Interest Rates: The central bank in this economy will adjust the nominal interest rate in each
period to keep inflation as close to zero as possible. As inflation increases, the central bank will
increase the nominal interest rate more than one-for-one with inflation. An increase in the nominal
interest rate has a direct negative effect on consumer demand and production, and an indirect neg-
ative effect on inflation. Importantly, you will not observe the current interest rate when you are
forming your inflation forecasts. After you submit your forecasts, the computer will solve for the
current period’s inflation using your forecasts and the current-period shock (which you will see).
It is important for you to realize that, even though the central bank is aiming for zero inflation, it
will rarely accomplish this. This is because of the random shocks that occur in each period and
the public’s expectations. However, the central bank will keep the economy more stable than the
economy would be in the absence of the central bank.
How the economy evolves:
Each period, you will submit your beliefs about inflation for the next period and the period after
that. To be clear, if we are in period 10, you will submit an inflation forecast for period 11 and for
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period 12. The software will use your two forecasts as the aggregate forecasts.
These aggregate forecasts play an important role in determining inflation today. This is because
inflation today is determined largely by aggregate forecasts about future inflation. If you expect
relatively high inflation tomorrow, then inflation today will be higher. The idea behind this is sim-
ple: If you communicates to the public that inflation is likely to rise tomorrow, consumers will
spend more immediately to avoid paying the relatively higher prices tomorrow. This increase in
demand today will cause prices to start rising today, and so inflation will increase today. Likewise,
if you predict higher inflation for two days from now, households will need to have a bit more
money tomorrow than they would otherwise to avoid paying the higher prices predicted for two
days from now.
More precisely, inflation and interest rates evolve according to the following equations:
Inflationt = 1.54(Your forecast of Inflationt+1)− 0.58(Median forecast of Inflationt+2)
+0.08(Shockt)
Interest Ratet = 4.44(Your forecast of Inflationt+1)− 3.12(Median forecast of Inflationt+2)
+ 0.41(Shockt)
Important information about this economy:
• The Central Bank sets the target inflation at zero. In order to achieve this target it will adjust
the nominal interest rate in each period. In some cases the nominal interest rate can become
negative.
• Expectations about tomorrow (if in period 10, this is your forecast for period 11) are self-
fulfilling in this economy. If you forecast higher inflation tomorrow then inflation will grow
higher in the current period. Similarly, a median forecast of lower inflation tomorrow will
cause inflation to fall in the current period.
• Expectations about two days from now (if in period 10, this is your forecast for period 12)
relate negatively to inflation today. If you forecast higher inflation for two-days from now,
then inflation today will fall. If instead you forecast lower inflation for two days from now,
inflation today will increase.
Score
Your forecasting score in each period will depend on the accuracy of forecasts formed in the
previous two periods. At the end of each period, the software will evaluate how accurate your
forecasts from one- and two-periods ago were about the inflation rate in the current period. The
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difference between these numbers forms your absolute forecast error. The larger this absolute error,
the lower is your forecasting score in that period. The letter p in the following example stands for
‘period’.
• Absolute Forecast Error = ‖Your Forecast− Actual Value‖
• Total Scorep =0.3(2−AbsoluteForecastErrorp−1 + 2−AbsoluteForecastErrorp−2)
The maximum score you can earn for forecasting in each period is 0.60 points. Your score will
decrease exponentially as your forecast error increases. Suppose your forecast errors for inflation
is:
0: Your score will be 0.6
50: Your score will be 0.42
100: Your score will be 0.30
200: Your score will be 0.15
300: Your score will be 0.075
500: Your score will be 0.02
1000: Your score will be 0
2000: Your score will be 0
Making decisions in this experiment
During this experiment, your main screen will display information that will help you make
forecasts and earn more points.
At the top left of the screen, you will see your subject number, the current period, time remain-
ing, and the total number of points you’ve earned through the previous period. You will also see
three history plots on your screen.
The top history plot displays past interest rates and current and past shocks.
The second history plot shows your 1-period-ahead points forecasts of inflation (blue dots), er-
ror bands that you create with your anticipated forecasting error (blue shading centered around your
point forecasts) and actual inflation (red dots). Note that the difference between your forecasts of
one-period-ahead inflation (blue dots) and the actual levels of inflation (red dots) constitutes your
one-period-ahead forecast error in past periods.
144
The third history plot shows your 2-period-ahead point forecasts of inflation (orange dots), error
bands that you create with your anticipated forecasting error (orange shading centered around your
point forecasts), and actual inflation (red dots). Note that the difference between your forecasts of
two-period-ahead inflation (orange dots) and the actual levels of inflation (red dots) constitute your
two-period-ahead forecast error in past periods.
Note: this section read one of three ways depending upon treatment:
For NoComm, skip directly to "You have 65 seconds...
For Point treatments:
Both the second and third plots also contain the Central Bank’s forecast of inflation for the next
five periods (green). It is important to remember that the projections are simply a forecast and not
a promise. The Central Bank uses the model discussed earlier in these instructions, and the current
and expected future shocks, to form its projections. In particular, it predicts that the economy will
return to zero levels of inflation in the near future.
For Point&Density treatments:
Both the second and third plots also contain the Central Bank’s forecast of inflation for the next five
periods (green). These forecasts also includes green shading, which represents the Central Bank’s
level of uncertainty for its corresponding point projections. These bands will contain the correct
realization of inflation about 66% of the time. It is important to remember that the projections are
simply a forecast and not a promise. The Central Bank uses the model discussed earlier in these
instructions, and the current and expected future shocks, to form its projections. In particular, it
predicts that the economy will return to zero levels of inflation in the near future.
You have 65 seconds to make decisions in the first nine periods and only 50 seconds thereafter.
You may submit both negative and positive forecasts and forecasts of 0. Please review your fore-
casts before pressing the SUBMIT button because you cannot revise your forecasts afterward.
The anticipated forecast error:
You must also submit a measure of how uncertain you are about your inflation forecasts. We
call this your anticipated forecasting error.Note this value should always be positive and your error
bounds are centered around your point forecast.
Suppose you forecast inflation tomorrow to be 10 basis points but feel more confident that ac-
tual inflation will fall between 5 and 15 basis points. You should indicate this by submitting an
anticipated forecasting error of 5. This forms anticipated error bounds of 5 to 15 since 10− 5 = 5
and 10 + 5 = 15. If actual inflation is any number from 5 to 15, we pay you. Otherwise, you earn
nothing for this anticipated forecasting error.
If actual inflation falls within your anticipated forecast error bounds, then we pay your antici-




Notice that your earnings for your anticipated forecast error decrease as your anticipated fore-
cast error increases. However, it is important for you to understand that we pay you this amount
ONLY if the realized value of inflation lies inside your anticipated forecasting error bands. If actual
inflation is outside your anticipated forecasting error bands, then you earn 0 points for providing
your anticipated forecasting error.
An example: Suppose it is period 3. Suppose in periods 1 and 2 you provided an inflation
forecast of 10 basis points for period 3 inflation. Suppose your anticipated forecasting error in
period 1 was 5 and in period 2 it was 10. Then your error bounds for period 1 are 5 to 15 and for
period 2 are 0 to 20. Suppose actual inflation at the end of period 3 is 17. Then you earn 0 points
for your anticipated forecast error provided in period 1. This is because 17 is not between 5 and
15. However, you would earn 15
10+10
= .75 points for your anticipated forecast error provided in
period 2, since 17 is between 0 and 20.
Our software will randomly select (with equal probability) to pay you for either your point
forecasts or for your anticipated forecast error in each period of play. We will never pay for both
in a single period.
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Figure A.1: Aggregate statistics in two- and one-period ahead NK DGPs
	 	 	 	    One- and two-period ahead 

	 	 	 	      inflation forecasting DGP       

	 	 	 	             One-period ahead 

	 	 	       inflation and output gap forecasting DGP	 	 	 

A.2 Comparison of two-period ahead and one-period ahead data-generating processes
The linearized New Keynesian model is typically presented as a function of one-period ahead
inflation and output gap expectations. The model can be rederived as a function of one- and two-
period ahead inflation expectations. We show in Figure Figure A.1 the impact of this modeling
choice on the standard deviation of inflation and one- and two-period ahead absolute inflation
forecast errors under alternative forecasting heuristics under alternative parameterizations of the
Adaptive(1), Constant Gain, and Trend-Chasing models (α, γ, and τ ). The top row presents simu-
lated results for the version that we implement in our experiment (where participants submit one-
and two-period ahead inflation forecasts), while the bottom row presents the results for the more
standard version (where participants submit one-period ahead inflation and output gap forecasts).
For simplicity, we will describe these as two- and one-period ahead models, respectively. To econ-
omize on space, we only include inflation expectations. Note that the one-period ahead model also
employs output gap expectations. For comparison, we also calculate and include the two-period
ahead forecast errors in the more conventional framework. The models are simulated for 50,000
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periods and approximated moments are calculated.
Under rational expectations, these models generate nearly identical simulations. Mean absolute
forecast errors are zero in both cases. The standard deviations of inflation in the two-period ahead
model are 35.41 and 33.90 bps in the two- and one-period ahead models, respectively. They differ
only because of the rounding that we employed in our experimental design (up to two decimal
points).
Under Adaptive(1) expectations, we assume that agents form the following inflation expecta-
tions:
Etπt+1 = απt−1 + (1− α)πt+1
Etπt+2 = απt−1 + (1− α)πt+2
and output gap expectations in a similar manner. In both the two- and one-period ahead models,
we see that the standard deviations of inflation are rather comparable, ranging from 45 bps to 113
bps in the two-period ahead model and 41 bps to 108 bps in the one-period ahead model. Forecast
errors are also quite comparable. Absolute one-period ahead inflation forecast errors range from 3
to 20 bps in the two-period ahead model and 3 to 28 bps in the one-period ahead model. Absolute
two-period ahead inflation forecast errors range from 3 to 22 bps in the two-period ahead model
and 3 to 27 bps in the one-period ahead model.
Under Target expectations, we assume that agents form the following inflation expectations:
Etπt+1 = Etπt+2 = 0
and the same for output gap expectations. The results are highly comparable across the two
types of DGPs. Standard deviations are 11 and 10.5 bps in the two- and one-period ahead models.
Likewise, absolute forecast errors are approximately the same (5 bps for one-period ahead fore-
casts and 3 bps for two-period ahead forecasts).
Under Naive expectations, we assume that agents simply use last period’s outcomes to form
their inflation expectations:
Etπt+1 = Etπt+2 = πt−1.
Under Constant Gain expectations, agents are assumed to update their past forecasts in response to
their most recently observed past forecast errors.
Etπt+1 = Et−2πt−1 − γ(Et−2πt−1 − πt−1)
Etπt+2 = Et−3πt−1 − γ(Et−3πt−1 − πt−1)
Finally, under Trend-Chasing expectations, agents are assumed to extrapolate recent trends
when forming their forecasts:
Etπt+1 = πt−1 + τ(πt−1 − πt−2)
Etπt+2 = πt−1 + 2τ(πt−1 − πt−2)
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Naive, Constant Gain, and especially Trend-Chasing heuristics lead to much less volatile results
in our two-period ahead version of the New Keynesian model. For the Naive model, the standard
deviation increases from 73 bps to 103 bps by moving from a two- to one-period ahead model.
Increasing the constant gain parameter, γ, or the trend-chasing parameter, τ , leads to significantly
more volatility in the one-period ahead model than in the two-period ahead model. Forecast errors
follow a similar pattern.
The relative volatilities and forecast errors are mostly preserved as we change the DGP to a
two-period ahead framework. One exception is with the Trend-Chasing heuristic, which generates
relatively more stable dynamics and smaller forecast errors compared to Constant Gain as the
parameters grow large. This is likely because of the negative feedback associated with t + 2
forecasts generated in our revised DGP. Extrapolative two-period ahead expectations would serve
to mute inflation in our two-period ahead model but not in the one-period ahead model.
A.3 Time series
Below we present comparisons of Group and Individual inflation rates, by treatment, in Fig-
ure A.2 to Figure A.4. The thick dark line denotes inflation in the Group treatment, while the light
lines indicate inflation for each individual subject’s session in the Individual treatment.
Figure A.2: Time series of NoComm sessions
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Figure A.3: Time series of Point sessions
Figure A.4: Time series of Point&Density sessions
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